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FOREWORD: REPRESENTATION WITHOUT PARTY:
LESSONS FROM STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTEMPTS
TO CONTROL GERRYMANDERING
James A. Gardner*
ABSTRACT

Since the founding, all gerrymandering of election districts, at both the
state and congressional levels, has been accomplished by state actors
operating almost exclusively under state law. State constitutions have often
served as afirst line of defense againstpublicly disfavored practices,and the
treatment of gerrymandering is no exception. The state constitutional record
reveals a gradual introduction,diffusion, and evolution of a wide variety of
provisions intended to control gerrymandering, including requirements of
contiguity, compactness, respect for local political boundaries, and
preservation of communities of interest, among others. Indeed, such
provisions have been validatedby the U.S. Supreme Court andfolded into its
redistricting jurisprudence under the banner of "traditional districting
*
Joseph W. Belluck and Laura L. Aswad Professor of Civil Justice, State University
of New York, University at Buffalo Law School; Director, Edwin F. Jaeckle Center for State
and Local Democracy. This is a greatly (some might say absurdly) expanded version of the
2005 State Constitutional Lecture, delivered at the Center for State Constitutional Studies at
Rutgers University-Camden on November 2, 2005. I thank Bob Williams and Alan Tarr, the
Center's co-directors, for inviting me and for their hospitality during my visit. Jim Campbell,
Fred Konefsky, Kristen Nussbaumer, and Jack Schlegel provided valuable comments on a
prior draft. Devon Runyan and Bill Piervincenzi provided research assistance. All citations to
state constitutional provisions dating from 1776 to 1902 are taken from THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITTMONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
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principles" to which states are constitutionallyfree to adhere. Yet it is clear
that these principles, intended to constrain legislative discretion in drawing
district lines, have been generally unsuccessful at restricting partisan
gerrymandering, which has become not only routine, but impressively
effective. Why have these provisionsfailed to impede this almost universally
condemned practice?
A close examination of the history of state constitutional attempts to
control gerrymanderingand the emergence of a state-leveljurisprudence of
apportionment suggests an answer. The existing panoply of state
constitutional controls on redistricting cannot effectively control partisan
gerrymanderingbecause it was, and still is, aimed at a completely different
problem: ensuringfair representationin the legislature of local economies
and the individuals who inhabit them. The principles of representationthat
emerged at the founding, and that have been carried forward in state
constitutions ever since, are rooted in two important beliefs: first, that a
community of interest entitled to representationis formed by participationin
a shared economy; and second, that such economies are inherently local,
and thus properly defined territorially-indeed, by reference to local
political units, predominantly counties, which were understood to comprise
fundamentally distinct economic units.
On this account of political representation, it is clear why state
constitutional apportionment controls
are
defenseless
against
gerrymandering motivated by partisan ends: state constitutions to this day
contemplate a kind of republicanpolitics in which party plays no overt role,
and in which gerrymandering consists of the artificial division of naturally
occurring economic communities. Any attempt to control partisan
manipulation of representation requires a constitutional system of
representation that contemplates some proper role in representativepolitics
for parties and partisanship-preciselywhat dominant state constitutional
conceptions lack. This is not to say that state constitutions therefore lack any
resources whatsoever to control partisan gerrymandering.It simply means
that any such resources cannot be drawn from "traditional districting
principles," but must find their source in more recent principles of equal
protection or structuralregulationof politicalparties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Politics is often thought of as the antithesis of law, yet the two are
intimately connected: politics inevitably takes place within an arena defined
and structured by law. Law establishes the ground rules of democratic
politics; it creates the offices to be filled, prescribes the powers officials may
exercise, decrees the times and formats of elections, establishes procedures
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for voting and campaigning, and in general sets the outer boundaries of
permissible behavior for participants in the enterprise of democratic
contestation for power.
Lately, the interaction between the law and politics of legislative
apportionment has attracted considerable attention, most of it negative.
Apportionment, otherwise known as redistricting,' refers to the familiar and
often contentious process by which state authorities-usually legislatures 2divide the state into districts for purposes of electing members of Congress
and the state legislature. Much of the contentiousness surrounding recent
redistricting cycles arises from charges that state legislatures have engaged in
gerrymandering, either by exercising their power of apportionment so as to
obtain or to expand a partisan advantage in legislative elections, or by using
1. On the federal level, a distinction is sometimes made between "apportionment" and
"districting" or "redistricting," with the former used to refer to the allocation of
representatives among the states in proportion to their population as required by U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3, and amend. XIV, § 2, and the latter terms used to refer to the postapportionment division of the state into the proper number of congressional election districts.
This terminological distinction has not been observed on the state level since the Supreme
Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which required state legislative
districts to adhere to the population equality principle of one person, one vote. Prior to
Reynolds, states sometimes used a two-stage process similar to the federal process, in which
representatives were first apportioned among counties and cities by population, and then those
units were sometimes further subdivided into districts. See infra Part III.A. After Reynolds,
however, all state election districts must contain roughly equal numbers of citizens, see Mahan
v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1973), and therefore the process of apportioning legislators
among state legislative districts necessarily occurs simultaneously with redrawing district
boundaries to comply with the one person, one vote standard.
2. Thirty-four state constitutions allocate apportionment authority to the legislature,
either through express delegation or omission to provide otherwise, although a substantial
minority of sixteen provides for an independent redistricting commission. ALASKA CONST. art.
VI, § 8; ARK. CONST. art. 8, § 1; ARiz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(3); COLO. CONST. art. V, §
48(1)(a); CONN. CONST. art. 3, § 6(a); DEL. CONST. art. II, § 2A; HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2;
IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 2(2); ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1-A; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; Mo.
CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2); N.J. CONST. art. II, § II, para. 1, art. IV,
§ III, para. 1; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; PA. CONST. art. II, § 17; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(1).
Not all of these states utilize the commission in the same way. The Connecticut redistricting
commission is convened only as a backup procedure in case the legislature fails to make a
timely apportionment. CONN. CONST. art. 3, § 6(b). The work of the Maine commission is
advisory only. Some states combine the two apportionment models by using different methods
to redistrict different bodies. For example, Colorado and Missouri designate a commission to
redistrict the state legislature, but require the state legislature to conduct congressional
redistricting. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48(1)(a); Mo. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 7. However, the
constitutional allocation of redistricting authority to the legislature does not necessarily
preclude the legislature from redelegating that authority by statute to an independent
commission, as in Iowa. See IOWA CODE §§ 42.5, 42.6 (1999).
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it to protect incumbent members of the legislature from serious electoral
competition by drawing them into "safe" districts dominated by partisan
supporters. 3
Charges of gerrymandering, and associated complaints about the
drawing of tortured election districts, have of course been around for years,
especially on the federal level. What seems new in the present round of
complaints about gerrymandering is not merely the depth of concern, but the
linkage of gerrymandering to other ailments of the political system. For
example, a growing body of literature contends that the rise of
gerrymandering has all but eliminated meaningful electoral competition in
the United States.4 State legislatures, moreover, seem to redistrict with
3. See infra note 4 for examples.
4. The literature on gerrymandering is voluminous. Works specifically arguing that
redistricting practices are responsible in some degree for a decline in the competitiveness of
elections include GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S SALAMANDER: THE
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (2002); Bruce E. Cain,
Karin MacDonald & Michael McDonald, From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political
Reform since Baker v. Carr, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 6, 21-23 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005); Sam
Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives:What Went Wrong in the Latest Round
of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179 (2003); Samuel Issacharoff,
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REv. 593 (2002); David Lublin &
Michael P. McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line?: The Impact of Redistricting on
Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L.J. 144 (2006). Other scholars have
reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander & Matthew
Gunning, Incumbency, Redistricting,and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections,
68 J. POL. 75 (2006) (finding no link between redistricting and declining competitiveness);
Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections:
An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000, 1 ELECTION L.J. 315, 326-28 (2002)
(finding a growing incumbency advantage in races for all offices, including gubernatorial and
senatorial races, thereby undermining the conclusion that declining competitiveness is due to
gerrymandering); JOHN N. FRIEDMAN & RICHARD T. HOLDEN, THE RISING INCUMBENT
REELECTION RATE: WHAT'S GERRYMANDERING GOT TO Do WITH IT? (2006), available at
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-jnfriedm/incumbents.pdf (finding that recent redistricting
practices have actually made elections more competitive); see also Justin Buchler,
Competition, Representation and Redistricting:The Case Against Competitive Congressional
Districts, 17 J. THEORETICAL POL. 431 (2005) (arguing that maximizing the number of
competitive districts may lead to an undesirably unrepresentative legislature); Andrew
Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL.
ScI. REv. 541, 553-54 (1994) (arguing that redistricting enhances electoral competitiveness
compared to not redistricting). Numerous recent reports calling for reform of the redistricting
process assume a strong link between legislative control over the redistricting process,
gerrymandering, and a decline in electoral competitiveness. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR.
& COUNCIL FOR EXCELLENCE IN GOv'T, THE SHAPE OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: REPORT
OF THE REDISTRICTING REFORM CONFERENCE (2005); DOUGLAS JOHNSON ET AL., ROSE INST. OF

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37:881

increasing boldness, barely bothering to disguise efforts to secure partisan
advantage. The recent advent of "re-redistricting"-the practice of revising
districting plans for a second time between censuses following a change in
partisan control of the state legislature-seems to exemplify this trend.
Public concern over these practices has led increasingly to calls for reform of
the redistricting process, and to6 a search for solutions characterized by a
renewed seriousness of purpose.
The fact that many of the most visible instances of alleged chicanery in
redistricting have occurred in the drawing of federal congressional districts
has, however, tended to obscure an important fact about the redistricting
process: these districts, like all congressional districts, were drawn not by
federal officials, but by state actors operating under state law. Indeed, by far
the most important source of law structuring the American political arena is
state law. State law provides the structural framework and rules of
engagement not only for state and local politics, but also for national politics.
Although the United States Constitution grants Congress ultimate authority
to regulate most aspects of congressional elections, it gives that power in the
first instance to state legislatures, subject to revision by Congress. 7 In actual
practice, Congress has used this power sparingly, meaning that virtually the
STATE & LOCAL GOv'T, RESTORING

THE COMPETITIVE EDGE: CALIFORNIA'S NEED FOR

REDISTRICTING REFORM AND TiHE LIKELY IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 77 (2005); ARi WEISBARD &
JEANNIE WILKINSON, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES & DEMOS, DRAWING LINES: A PUBLIC

INTEREST GUIDE TO REAL REDISTRICTING REFORM 3,

6 (2005) (internet citations omitted; all

reports available in PDF format).
5. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006)
(permitting the Texas state legislature to override a court-drawn redistricting plan middecade); People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003) (invalidating Colorado
General Assembly's re-redistricting under provisions of the state constitution).
6. Among the more serious and thoughtful calls for reform by private groups are
reports by the Campaign Legal Center; Council for Excellence in Government; Rose Institute
of State and Local Government; Center for Governmental Studies; and Demos. See generally
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. & COUNCIL FOR EXCELLENCE IN GOv'T, supra note 4; JOHNSON ET AL.,
supra note 4; WEISBARD & WILKINSON, supra note 4.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.
...). The
congressional power to regulate presidential elections is much more limited. See U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors .... "). No express power of congressional revision is granted,
although a limited congressional regulatory power has been inferred for the purpose of
controlling serious threats to the integrity and legitimacy of national democratic processes.
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314-15 (1941); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S.
534, 545 (1934).
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entire body of law structuring and regulating every aspect of the national
political process-including the law structuring legislative apportionmenthas been created, and is overseen and implemented, by the states.
American state legislatures have a long history of gerrymandering; the
practice got its name, after all, from an 1812 districting plan designed by
Republicans to keep the Massachusetts state senate from falling into
Federalist hands. 8 And notwithstanding all the attention given recently to
gerrymandering on the federal level, many of the most egregious, yet less
publicly visible, gerrymanders have occurred on the state level in the
drawing of state legislative districts. A notorious example is New York's
collusive, bipartisan gerrymander that for thirty years has allocated iron-clad
control of the state assembly to Democrats and of the state senate to
Republicans 9 in a state in which registered Democrats outnumber registered
Republicans by approximately five to three. 10
Any discussion of how to control gerrymandering, then, must begin by
considering how to control state legislatures, and any consideration of how to
control state legislatures stands to benefit from consulting the extensive body
of state constitutional law that for the last 230 years has taken as perhaps its
main objective the control of state legislative behavior. In seeking solutions
to the problems of gerrymandering, an examination of state constitutions has
much to recommend it. First, state constitutional law is not only
hierarchically superior to other forms of state law that structure the American
political process, but also typically deals directly, deliberately, and in detail
with the structure and regulation of politics. Unlike the U.S. Constitution,
which has very little to say about politics and electoral structures,1' every
8.

GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, ELBRIDGE GERRY: FOUNDING FATHER AND REPUBLICAN

STATESMAN 316-17 (1976); ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE

GERRYMANDER 19-20, 64-74 (photo. reprint, Arno Press 1974) (1907).
9.

Gerald Benjamin, Reform in New York: The Budget, the Legislature, and the

Governance Process, 67 ALB. L. REV. 1021, 1052-53 (2004). For earlier accounts, see CALVIN
B.T. LEE, ONE MAN, ONE VOTE: WMCA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL REPRESENTATION
(1967); RICHARD LEHNE, LEGISLATING REAPPORTIONMENT IN NEW YORK (1971).

10. N.Y. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, COUNTY ENROLLMENT TOTALS 01-APR-06,
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/countyaprO6.htm (last visited

Nov. 1, 2006).
11. For example, the clause of the U.S. Constitution prescribing a democratically
elected House of Representatives provides only: "The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. Absolutely no details of this process of electoral selection are
specified. This is not to say that the U.S. Constitution has no role in structuring American
politics; on the contrary, the Constitution is the source of some extremely important principles
of democratic self-governance, including the principle of one person, one vote, see Reynolds
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state constitution contains numerous provisions self-consciously intended to
frame and to direct
political processes occurring within the state, including
2
apportionment.'
Second, the American states have a long history of using their state
13
constitutions to institutionalize restrictions on publicly disfavored practices,
and as we shall see, gerrymandering follows this common pattern. If states
are the main locus of the gerrymandering problem, they may also be the
source of solutions to the problem, insofar as any ideas or lessons can be
drawn from the extensive history and jurisprudence of state attempts to
constrain gerrymandering through state constitutional restrictions.
Finally, state constitutional approaches to constraining gerrymandering
are of additional interest on the federal level. In the recent case of Vieth v.
14
Jubelirer,
the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to articulate a standard under
the federal Equal Protection Clause to limit partisan gerrymandering.
However, as in its only previous encounter with the issue, Davis v.
Bandemer,15 the Court splintered badly, and in a way that left state
legislators, political operatives, lower courts and the election law bar entirely
without meaningful guidance. In a ruling that produced five separate
opinions and advanced four different standards for evaluating the
constitutionality of redistricting plans (none of which commanded more than
two votes), Justice Kennedy provided the critical swing vote. While refusing
to endorse any of the standards proposed by his colleagues, Justice Kennedy
argued that "there are yet no agreed upon substantive principles of fairness in
districting," and that as a result, "we have no basis on which to define clear,
manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the particular
'6
burden a given partisan classification imposes on representational rights."'
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy preferred to wait to see "[i]f suitable
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); a prohibition on racial discrimination in electoral regulation, see
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-70 (1973); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 34647 (1960); and rules strongly favoring free speech in political campaigns, see, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). These principles, however, have either been teased out
of the Constitution on very thin evidence (one person, one vote), or represent applications in
the political arena of principles of far broader application (freedom of speech).
12. For an overview of state constitutional regulation of political processes, see James
A. Gardner, Voting and Elections, in STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
145 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006).
13. For a catalogue of representative examples, see G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 118-21 (1998).
14. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
15. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
16. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307-08 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
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standards with which to measure the burden a gerrymander imposes on
representational rights [do] emerge." 17 Vieth, and an equally inconclusive
decision last Term in LULAC v. Perry, 8 thus implicitly invite an
examination of the long history of state constitutional apportionment
regulation to determine whether it might provide any guidance not only for
state-level solutions to the problem of partisan gerrymandering, but also for
federal equal protection jurisprudence in the pursuit of a uniform, nationwide
standard for fair redistricting. 9
Since the earliest days of the republic, states have developed and
constitutionalized numerous well-known methods for constraining
gerrymandering, including requirements that election districts be composed
of contiguous territory, that they be geographically compact, that they
respect local political boundaries, and that they preserve communities of
interest. In this paper, I propose to examine these and a host of other, related
provisions. Where did they come from? At what abuses were they aimed?
How are they deployed? And, most importantly, do they hold any promise
for constraining 20the almost universally condemned practice of partisan
gerrymandering?
My answer to this final question, in brief, is that they do not. These kinds
of constraints-what the U.S. Supreme Court calls "traditional districting
principles" 2 '-are not adequate to the task of restricting partisan
gerrymandering because they do not speak to gerrymandering undertaken for
17. Id. at 313.
18. 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
19. I initially raised this question in James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy for
Litigating PartisanGerrymandering Claims, 3 ELECTION L.J. 643 (2004). Here, I attempt to
take the first, very preliminary step in answering it.
20. In the analysis that follows, I do not follow the increasingly common practice of
distinguishing between a "partisan gerrymander," the goal of which is maximize the strength
of one political party at the expense of the other, and an "incumbent gerrymander," the goal of
which is to return to office as many incumbents of both parties as possible. I do not view these
as distinct problems; drawing a district that is safe for an incumbent does not involve a
problem any different from drawing one that is safe for any other member of the incumbent's
party, though the margin of safety may be lower where the goal is merely to return an
incumbent. Both enterprises are possible only insofar as redistricters may rely on the partisan
predispositions of the district's voters. Even if this were not the case, both kinds of
gerrymanders are thought to deviate from the proper working of a system of democratic
representation, and it is an understanding of the baseline conception of proper representation
that I am after here. Consequently, it is not necessary for me to distinguish these two
strategies.
21. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (cautioning states against
"disregarding traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for
political subdivisions").
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partisan gain. Rather, they emerged historically and jurisprudentially to
guard against other kinds of distortions in representation and they reflect an
older, largely republican theory of representation that still survives in today's
state constitutions and that embraces theories of politics and representation in
which political parties play no significant role. Consequently, the traditional
districting principles widely constitutionalized at the state level to regulate
the drawing of election district boundaries hold out little hope as a source of
rules, or even inspiration, for contemporary efforts to find and implement
workable constitutional constraints on gerrymandering motivated by partisan
considerations.
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. Part HIintroduces the
subject by defining gerrymandering and surveying the panoply of antigerrymandering provisions contained in contemporary state constitutions.
Part I1 undertakes an historical examination of the origin and development
of these provisions, finding the record inconclusive in that it turns up no
clear historical event or paradigm concern that might be said to motivate, and
in consequence to guide our understanding of, the most common state
constitutional provisions aimed at controlling gerrymandering. In an effort to
get some greater purchase on the meaning of state constitutional antigerrymandering provisions, Part IV turns to the case law to determine how
state courts have interpreted them. I conclude based upon this inquiry that
state constitutions tend to embrace a fairly clear-but to modem sensibilities,
unfamiliar-model of representation in which the basic units to be
represented are not individuals, but local political units, which are in turn
conceived as distinct, coherent groupings of economic and administrative
activity, giving rise for the most part to communities of shared economic
interest. The historically most common anti-gerrymandering provisions
contained in state constitutions are primarily aimed, therefore, at preventing
forms of representation that fragment local economies.
Part V delves deeper into the conception of politics implicitly framed by
state constitutional apportionment provisions, concluding that the dominant
conception presupposes three main features that state constitutional
provisions are meant to preserve: a delegate model of representation; an
intradistrict electoral politics that is harmonious; and a state-level legislative
politics that is pluralistic, conflictual, and oriented toward the resolution of
competing local claims regarding economic issues. In so doing, Part V offers
a partial explanation of why partisan gerrymandering is so difficult to control
within the framework of politics created by the traditional districting
principles commonly found in state constitutions. The article concludes by
suggesting other resources contained in state constitutions that might prove
more effective in constraining partisan gerrymandering.
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II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS ON GERRYMANDERING

A. Gerrymanderingin Its ProceduralContext
Today, the term "gerrymandering" has come to have a rather narrow
meaning confined to the manipulation of election district lines for political
advantage. 22 While this usage is certainly correct, it obscures the important
fact that gerrymandering is only one manifestation of a much more general
phenomenon: the opportunistic manipulation of the rules of governance to
increase or consolidate power for political gain.
Although gerrymandering concerns the manipulation of election district
lines, it is no different in principle from the manipulation of any other rule
governing the procedures by which political power is exercised. Electoral
rules specifying the qualifications of voters, registration requirements, ballot
access requirements, and vote aggregation methods, for example, all can
be-and have been-manipulated to favor those in power.2 3 Wholly apart
from elections, rules of legislative procedure such as those allocating
committee assignments and chairmanships, and rules controlling committee
voting and floor debate can also be manipulated by those in power to
perpetuate their own control of the legislature. During the mid-twentieth
century, for example, congressional seniority rules were every bit as
important as district malapportionment in securing the long dominance in
Congress of conservative rural Democrats until their overthrow by the postWatergate class of 1974.24 Even constitutional meta-rules can affect the
exercise of power. During the early nineteenth century, battles over the state
constitutional amendment process frequently were proxies for fights over
regional malapportionment: beneficiaries of malapportionment sought to
22. For example, the Random House Dictionary defines "gerrymander" as "the dividing
of a state, county, etc., into election districts so as to give one political party a majority in
many districts while concentrating the voting strength of the other party into as few districts as
possible." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 801 (2d unabridged ed.

1987).
23. See, e.g., ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 54-67, 129-59 (2000) (qualifications, registration); J.
MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, at 47-72 (1974) (registration,

qualifications, taxes); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politicsas Markets: Partisan
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REv. 643, 667-74 (1998) (ballot access
restrictions); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND

THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 139, 351-53 (1999) (at-large voting systems).
24. See STEVENS. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, COMMrITEES IN CONGRESS 41, 4649, 120 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the rise and fall of the congressional seniority system).
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freeze their advantage by making constitutional amendment difficult, while
victims of malapportionment supported easier amendment in the hope of
facilitating more equitable reapportionment in the future.25 Nothing,
therefore, distinguishes in principle the opportunistic drawing of district lines
from any other opportunistic manipulation of the rules of democratic
governance.
The manipulation of representation is a very old activity even within the
relatively short history of American self-government. In colonial times,
governors occasionally manipulated the rules of representation in colonial
legislatures to obtain the legislative outcomes they preferred by blocking the
establishment of election districts in newly settled areas "whenever they
feared the new members would not support their policy. '26 This practice
reached its apogee in New Hampshire, where by 1773 two-thirds of the
colony's towns lacked legislative representation. 7 Legislatures dominated by
representatives from older, more established areas had their own reasons for
declining to authorize representation for newly settled areas in the interior:
new legislative representation of such areas would dilute their own influence.
For example, as Rosemarie Zagarri reports, "[b]y 1775 Pennsylvania's three
eastern counties had twenty-six delegates whereas the eight western counties,
with over half the population, had only fifteen delegates. 28 This is not
gerrymandering in the colloquial sense, but it is a method of manipulating
representation to which gerrymandering is intimately related.
Given this history, it is no surprise that disputes over the basis of
legislative representation under the U.S. Constitution plagued the 1787
constitutional convention. One of the main points of contention concerned
whether states would be represented in Congress as individual corporate
political bodies or by population, resulting in the Great Compromise in
which representation was by state in the Senate and by population in the

25.

JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 32-34, 37-47

(2006).
26. GRIFFrrH, supra note 8, at 26; see also WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN
THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 234 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littlefield

Publishers, expanded ed. 2001) (1973)

("In Massachusetts, the royal governors had

incorporated new towns without granting them any representation.").
27. See MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY & LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION
MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 68 (1997) ("101 of 147 towns were unrepresented in
the assembly in 1773, although they paid more than a third of the province's taxes.").
28.

ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI,

STATES, 1776-1850 (1987), at 43.
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House-a gerrymander, as it were, in favor of the less populous states. 29 The
Three-Fifths Clause of Article I, Section 2, under which state populations
were to be calculated for purposes of House representation "by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons ... three fifths of all [slaves]," 30 resulted from
a similar dispute about the basis of representation and amounted to a kind of
gerrymander in favor of the slave states.31 Until Congress enacted the
Apportionment Act of 1842,32 which required state congressional delegations
to be elected by district rather than at large, it was not uncommon for state
legislatures to switch opportunistically between the two methods depending
upon which method would produce results more favorable to the party in
power.33
Although rigging district lines through gerrymandering was a tool
generally available to state legislatures, 34 it was, in comparison to other
practices that produced similar results, unsubtle and often unnecessary.
Gerrymandering in the modem sense requires making affirmative changes to
district lines-changes, that is, to the legal status quo. Yet changing the
status quo is usually more difficult than preserving it, and shifting voters in
and out of districts is the kind of thing they cannot help but notice. Thus,
legislative partisans often lacked any good reason to resort to
gerrymandering when doing nothing, or making less noticeable kinds of
changes to electoral rules, might produce the desired effect.

29. For the composition of the Senate, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S.
CONST. amend. XVII, § 1. For the composition of the House, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3,
amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. For an excellent account of the debate preceding
the Great Compromise, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: PoLrTcs AND IDEAS IN
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTIT'ION 57-79 (1996).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
31. This turned out to be an extremely important adjustment. According to Garry Wills,
the additional representation provided to slave-owning states under the Three-Fifths Clause,
replicated in the Electoral College, provided Jefferson with his winning margin over Adams in
the election of 1800. GARRY WILLS, "NEGRO PRESIDENT": JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER
1-3 (2003). It also allowed the South to dominate federal offices before 1850, pass the gag
rule, and otherwise prevent congressional confrontation over issues related to slavery. Id. at 413.
32. Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491.
33. See GRIFFITH, supra note 8, at 101-02; ZAGARRI, supra note 28, at 115-17.
34. It was not always available. To prevent legislative gerrymandering, a few state
constitutions have resorted to complete enumerations of the number and boundaries of
election districts. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1897). Of course, such provisions do not
preclude the possibility that the desired gerrymandering was performed at the constitutional
convention rather than by the legislature.

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37:881

Not until the U.S. Supreme Court decided in 1964 that all congressional
and state legislative districts must contain equal numbers of voters35 and that
redistricting to preserve population equality would be required following
each decennial census, did gerrymandering as a tool of electoral
manipulation attract the kind of interest it enjoys today. After the Court's
rulings, redistricting became a routine practice rather than an unusual one,
and the mandatory redrawing of district lines to achieve interdistrict
population equality provided convenient cover for the pursuit of other, more
partisan goals. At the same time, other constitutional rulings and statutory
reforms outlawed practices such as poll taxes, 36 literacy tests, 37 and at-large
voting 38 that had previously been used in some places by dominant groups to
preserve their political power.
In light of this history, it would be a mistake to view gerrymandering as
a practice somehow distinct in kind from the many other forms of
opportunistic manipulation of electoral rules to which politically dominant
groups have resorted to entrench their dominance.39 In the balance of my
analysis, and in particular throughout my investigation of the historical
evolution of state constitutional anti-gerrymandering provisions in Parts III
and IV, I therefore attend to numerous aspects of state constitutional
development relating to methods of manipulating representation that do not
involve the direct legislative alteration of election district boundaries, but
nevertheless are capable of achieving similar results.
B. ContemporaryState ConstitutionalAnti-GerrymanderingProvisions
For purposes of orientation, a useful place to begin is with a quick
overview of the panoply of anti-gerrymandering constraints contained in
contemporary state constitutions. By far the most common, and oldest, antigerrymandering provisions are those requiring election districts to be
"contiguous," a provision appearing today in thirty-seven state

35. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7
(1964).
36. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-70 (1966).
37. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(2)(c) (2000).
38. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973).
39. On the manipulation of legal rules for purposes of political entrenchment, see
generally Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 23 (discussing manipulation of primary eligibility
rules, ballot access rules, the two-party system, and campaign finance rules, among other
techniques).
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constitutions, n° and "compact," a requirement imposed by twenty-four
constitutions. 4 1 Although the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution imposes a binding population equality requirement on all state
legislative districts,42 thirty state constitutions presently have provisions that
independently require election districts to have equal or approximately equal
populations.43 Two of these, Colorado's and Ohio's, explicitly impose a

40. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6; ARIz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)(C); ARK. CONST. art.
8, § 3 (senate districts); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1(c); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(1); CONN.
CONST. art. 3, §§ 3, 4; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 2A; GA. CONST. art. III, § II, para. II; HAW.
CONST. art. IV, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a); IND. CONST. art. 4, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. III,
§§ 34, 37; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 2; MD. CONST. art. III, § 4; MASS. CONST. amend. art.
CI, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 3 ("contiguous by land"); MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 3;
Miss. CONST. art. 13, § 254; MO. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 5 (Congress); MONT. CONST. art. V, §
14(1); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 26 (senate); N.J. CONST. art. IV, § II,
paras. 1, 3; N.Y. CONST. art. III, §§ 4, 5; N.C. CONST. art. H, §§ 3, 5; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2;
OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 7(A); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 9A (senate); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 7; PA.
CONST. art. II, § 16, art. VII, § 9 (election districts), art. IX, § II (local); S.D. CONST. art. III, §
5; TEx. CONST. art. III, § 25; VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 13, 18; VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; WASH.
CONST. art. II, §§ 6, 43(5); W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (requiring contiguous counties for the
election of representatives to Congress), art. VI, § 4 (state senatorial districts); WIS. CONST.
art. IV, §§ 4, 5.
41. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6; ARIz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)(C); COLO. CONST.
art. V, § 47(1) (legislative districts), art. VI, § 10(1) (judicial districts); HAW. CONST. art. IV, §
6; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a); IOWA CONST. art. Il, § 34; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 2; MD.
CONST. art. III, § 4; MICH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 3; Mo. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 5 (Congress);
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(1) (1984 amendment); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 5; N.J. CONST. art.
IV, § II, para. 3 (Assembly); N.Y. CONST. art. III, §§ 4, 5; N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2; OH-o
CONST. art. XI, § 7(A); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 9A; PA. CONST. art. II, § 16, art. VII, § 9
(election districts), art. IX, § 11 (local); R.I. CONST. art. VII, § 1, art. VIII, § 1; S.D. CONST.
art. III, § 5; VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 13, 18; VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. II, §
43(5); W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (Congress), art. VI, § 4 (state senate); Wis. CONST. art. IV, § 4
(assembly); WYO. CONST. art. III, § 49 (congressional). For a collection of mostly recent
judicial decisions interpreting and applying state constitutional compactness requirements to
redistricting, see Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Application of Constitutional "Compactness
Requirement" to Redistricting, 114 A.L.R.5th 311 (2003).
42. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
43. ALA. CONST. art. IX, § 200; ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6; ARIz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, §
1(14)(B); ARK. CONST. art. 8, § 3 (senatorial), amend. 55, § 2(a) (County Quorum Courts);
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § l(b); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 46; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 2A; HAW.
CONST. art. IV, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a); Ky. CONST. § 33; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, §
2; MD. CONST. art. IIl, § 4; MASS. CONST. amend. art. CI, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 3;
MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 5 (Congress); MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(1); NEB. CONST. art. III, §
5 (legislature); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 26; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § II, para. 3; N.Y. CONST. art.
III, § 4; N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3, 5; OHIO CONST. art. XI, §§ 3, 4; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 9A;
PA. CONST. art. II, § 16, art. IX, § 11 (local); R.I. CONST. art. VII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5;
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more stringent population equality requirement than does the U.S.
Constitution. 44 Twenty state constitutions also contain some kind of
restriction on the division of local government units or the crossing of local
government boundaries in the creation of election districts.4 5 Six state
constitutions require districts to be "convenient, ' 4 6 a now archaic term
usually understood to refer
to the ability of citizens or candidates to travel
47
district.
the
about
easily
In addition to these older provisions, a new generation of more precise
and sophisticated anti-gerrymandering provisions began to appear in state
constitutions during the last half-century, introducing a new vocabulary and
stock of legal concepts for assessing the validity of state legislative election
districts. The first of these, requiring districts to contain "a relatively
TENN. CONST. art. II, § 4; VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 13, 18; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(5); W. VA.
CONST. art. I, § 4 (Congress), art. VI, § 4 (state senate).
44. Under Supreme Court precedents, state legislative districts will generally be upheld
if the population deviations among districts do not exceed ten percent. Brown v. Thomson,
462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983). But see Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949-50 (2004) (summarily
affirming a lower court's ruling that a districting plan may be invalid even if it is within the
ten percent deviation range if such deviations cannot be justified by a legitimate state interest
other than partisan gerrymandering). Colorado and Ohio, however, prohibit district population
deviations in excess of five percent. See COLO.CONST. art. V, § 46; OHIO CONST. art. XI, §§ 3,
4.
45. Providing that local government boundaries are to be respected as a factor to
consider in apportionment: ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6; ARIz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)(E);
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1(e); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(2); MD.CONST. art. III, § 4; MICH.
CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 3; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 9A; TENN. CO ST. art. H, § 4. Providing that
local government units are not to be divided: ALA. CONST. art. IX, § 200; COLO.CONST. art. V,
§ 47(1); Ky. CONST. § 33 (except for multi-district counties); MASS. CONST. amend. art. CI, §
1 (restricting the division of towns containing fewer than 2500 inhabitants when drawing
representative districts); N.H. CONST. pt. II, arts. 9, 26. Local government boundaries to be
used to create election district boundaries: OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. II, §
43(5); WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (assembly); see also ME.CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 2 (political
subdivision boundaries to be crossed the least number of times possible); NEB. CONST. art. III,
§ 5, art. VII, § 10 ("county lines to be followed whenever practicable"); N.J. CONST. art. IV, §
H, para. 3 (counties and municipalities to be divided into the fewest possible number of
districts when drawing assembly districts); PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (local government units not
to be divided unless absolutely necessary); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 18 (legislature to seek to
adhere to local boundaries).
46. MICH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 3; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 3; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 5;
N.Y. CONST. art. IHI, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. II, §§ 6,43(5); WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
47. E.g., People ex rel. Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors, 42 N.E. 592, 593 (N.Y. 1896); In re
Livingston, 160 N.Y.S. 462, 469 (Sup. Ct. 1916). Today, the requirement of easy travel
around a district is more often subsumed under the requirements of contiguity or compactness.
See, e.g., Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. Wis. 1992); Wilkins v. West,
571 S.E.2d 100, 109 (Va. 2002).
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integrated socio-economic area," appeared in 1959 in the Alaska
Constitution.4 8 Soon thereafter, Oklahoma (1964) required that consideration49
be given in drawing districts to "economic and political interests" ;
Colorado (1974) required preservation of "communities of interest," which it
defined to include "ethnic, cultural, economic, trade area, geographic, and
demographic factors"; 50 Hawaii (1978) discouraged the "submergence" of
distinct "socio-economic interests"; 5' and Arizona (2000) required "respect
[for] communities of interest., 52 The new generation of provision, however,
that most directly addresses the problem of partisan gerrymandering is found
in the constitutions of Delaware (1963), Hawaii (1978), and Washington
(1983), and expressly forbids discrimination in districting against any person,
group, or political party.53 This trend culminated in the recent initiative
amendment to the Arizona Constitution (2000), which provides: "To the
extent practicable, competitive districts should be favored ....
While there can be little doubt that provisions such as the ones just
reviewed are intended to prevent gerrymandering, this intuition is confirmed
directly by state courts that have interpreted them. For example, the Alaska
Supreme Court has bluntly held that "[t]he requirements of contiguity,
compactness and socio-economic integration were incorporated by the
framers of the reapportionment provisions to prevent gerrymandering,, 55 and
the New York Court of Appeals has described the requirements of
compactness, contiguity, and convenience as "the State Constitution's antigerrymander provisions. ,,56
48. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6.
49. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 9A.
50. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(3).
51. HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
52. ARIz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § l(14)(D).
53. DEL. CONST. art. II, § 2A (districts may not "unduly favor any person or political
party"); HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (districts may not "unduly favor a person or political
faction"); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(5) (districts may "not be drawn purposely to favor or
discriminate against any political party or group").
54. ARiz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)(F).
55. Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1992).
56. Schneider v. Rockefeller, 293 N.E.2d 67, 71 (N.Y. 1972); see also In re
Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1244-45 (Colo. 2002) (stating that
Colorado constitutional provisions limiting interdistrict population deviations; requiring the
minimization of the aggregate linear distance of district boundaries; encouraging the
preservation of communities of interest; and discouraging the splitting of cities and towns
were aimed at "reducing both partisan politics and gerrymandering"); People ex rel. Woodyatt
v. Thompson, 40 N.E. 307, 315 (I11.1895) (finding that "requirement of compactness" was
added in 1870 "to guard, as far as practicable ... against a legislative evil commonly known
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Yet to know that these provisions exist, and that they are meant to
constrain gerrymandering, tells us comparatively little about precisely what
kinds of district lines will pass constitutional muster. To answer that
question, we need to know more. Where did these provisions come from? To
what specific problems were they addressed? What system or theory of
representation do they seek to implement? And perhaps most important of
all, why have they had such little success in controlling partisan
gerrymandering? I attempt to answer these questions in two ways: first,
through an historical examination of the emergence and evolution of state
constitutional anti-gerrymandering provisions from 1776 to the present (Part
HI, below); and second, through examination57 of judicial decisions
interpreting and applying such provisions (Part IV).

as the 'gerrymander"'); In re Legislative Districting of State, 475 A.2d 428, 436 (Md. 1984)
("[T]he contiguity and compactness requirements . . . are intended to prevent political
gerrymandering."); In re Apportionment of Mich. Legislature, 137 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Mich.
1965) (concluding that constitutional convention "selected a plan which, with its adherence to
county, city and township lines, compactness, rectangular or nearly uniform or square lines, et
cetera, would make gerrymandering most difficult"); State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146
S.W. 40, 61 (Mo. 1912) (stating that contiguity and compactness requirements were adopted
"to guard, as far as practicable . . .against a legislative evil, commonly known as the
'gerrymander"'); Jackman v. Bodine, 262 A.2d 389, 393 (N.J. 1970) (noting that adherence to
"existing county and municipal lines does not foreclose partisan selection of district lines, but
it does limit that opportunity"); In re Dowling, 113 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1916) (state
constitutional provision limiting interdistrict population deviations to less than the population
of any adjoining town or block was intended to prevent districting "'outrages ...perpetuated
on the State by partisan legislatures"' (quoting unidentified member of 1894 constitutional
convention)); Opinion to the Governor, 221 A.2d 799, 802 (R.I. 1966) ("Undoubtedly a
principal inducing factor for ...adoption [of the compactness requirement] was the desire to
avoid the political gerrymander."); Parkinson v. Watson, 291 P.2d 400, 412 (Utah 1955)
(McDonough, C.J., dissenting) (finding that provision of state constitution requiring senatorial
districts to be composed of contiguous counties was "probably adopted to prevent use of the
device of 'gerrymandering' by future legislatures").
57. In conducting this study, I have had to make some difficult choices about what
sources to consult. Among the sources I have not examined in any systematic way are the
records of state constitutional conventions, which I have consulted only in a very limited way,
and state legislation dealing with apportionment, which I have not consulted at all. It is
possible that examination of these sources might alter the analysis presented here, and I hope
that future studies will include such resources.
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III. THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS ON GERRYMANDERING

As students of state constitutionalism well know, commonplace
provisions constraining legislative power that are found widely among the
constitutions of the various states often have their source in some specific
and readily identifiable historical event or series of events. Attention to the
historical origin of such provisions often aids in their interpretation, as it is
reasonable to assume that they should be understood as devices designed
primarily to prevent any repetition of the particular legislative behavior that
prompted their initial adoption. When it comes to state constitutional
constraints on gerrymandering, however, the historical record is,
unfortunately, inconclusive; there is no "smoking gun, 58 no clear event or
sequence of events that we can unequivocally identify as the source of these
provisions, or the motivating event or paradigm case to which they are
directed.
Given the provenance of the term "gerrymandering" in just such a
specific and easily identifiable event, one might naturally suspect the
infamous 1812 Massachusetts redistricting law signed by Governor Elbridge
Gerry to be just the kind of smoking gun we might hope to find. This turns
out not to be the case. Provisions restricting state legislatures' ability to
manipulate the size and shape of election districts appear in state
constitutions well before 1812, and the rate at which such provisions spread
from one state constitution to another bears no relation to the events of 1812.
Instead, constraints on legislative discretion in apportionment appear to have
percolated steadily throughout the states, often without any clear motivating
incident; indeed, many such provisions appear to have been adopted even
before specific problems of the type to which they were addressed had ever
arisen. 59 The story of the constitutional evolution of anti-gerrymandering
provisions is not without interest, and I propose to relate it here; but
instrumentally-minded readers more interested in answers than a good yarn
might do well to skip now to the next Part.

58. I am grateful to Fred Konefsky for suggesting this formulation.
59. Or,at least, so it appears from readily identifiable sources such as standard histories
of apportionment and judicial accounts of state constitutional anti-gerrymandering provisions.
It is of course possible that apportionment chicanery occurred more widely than is commonly
recognized, and that the adoption of state constitutional provisions controlling gerrymandering
therefore responds more directly to specific acts of malfeasance than is readily revealed by the
historical record.
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In the account that follows, I focus on five different, yet closely related
types of provisions structuring legislative representation. I begin with an
examination of (1) the unit of representation (e.g., county, town, individual,
etc.); (2) formulae for allocating legislators among the represented units; (3)
the total number of legislators allowed to each legislative chamber; and (4)
whether election is from single-member or multi-member districts. Only
after examining the development and evolution of these types of provisions
do I turn to the main event: (5) restrictions targeted specifically at the
drawing of election district lines (e.g., contiguity and compactness
requirements, limitations on the division of local government units, etc.).
Although only the last type of provision is commonly thought of today as a
method for controlling gerrymandering, all of the first four factors, as we
shall see, can be manipulated for partisan gain by those in power without
ever changing, or even drawing, a single election district line.
A. The Unit of Representation
Nowadays, the abstract and almost infinitely flexible "election district"
serves as the basic unit of electoral representation in state legislatures and
Congress. This was not always the case. Until about 1845, state constitutions
overwhelmingly designated the county as the primary unit of representation
in the house of representatives, or lower chamber, of the state legislature;
that is, representatives were by constitutional direction elected from counties
rather than from other territorial divisions of the state. Thus, for example, the
New York Constitution of 1777 specified that the members of the state
assembly were "to be annually chosen in the several counties," and then went6
on to specify the number of representatives to be elected from each county; 0
the Delaware Constitution of 1831 decreed that "[tihere shall be seven
representatives chosen in each county, '61 and so on. Of the fifty-two state
constitutions or pertinent apportionment-related amendments adopted
between 1776 and 1844, twenty-two designated counties as the exclusive
basis of representation in the state house; 62 six used counties as the basic unit
60. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. IV.
61. DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. II, § 2.
62. See DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 3; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. III; VA. CONST. of 1776,
para. 25; GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. IV, V; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. IV; GA. CONST. of 1789,
art. I, § 6; DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. II,§ 2; Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. I, §§ 4, 6; TENN. CONST.
of 1796, art. I, § 2; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 7; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, amend. 11 (1801);
Ono CONST. of 1802, art. I, § 2; LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 5; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. III,
§ 2; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, §§ 2, 4; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. I, § 7; DEL. CONST. of
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of representation, but also granted separate representation to the state's major
cities (Philadelphia, Annapolis, Baltimore) 63 or to other cities or towns of
sufficient size; 64 five constitutions used towns, New England's functional
equivalent of counties, as the exclusive unit of representation; 65 and four
used some combination of counties, towns, and cities. 66 A minority of fifteen
state constitutions during that period used districts for purposes of
representation, either exclusively67 or68in combination with fixed local units
such as counties, parishes, and towns.
After 1850 or so, the trend in state house representation moved distinctly
toward the use of districts; by 1890, the constitutions of only twelve of the
nation's forty-four states still required the use exclusively of whole local
government units. 69 Apparently, the move away from fixed units of local
governments and toward districts as the unit of representation resulted from a
1831, art. II, § 2; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 2 (1835); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 34;
FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § 1; N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, § III.
63. See MD. CONST. of 1776, arts. II, IV, V; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; MD. CONST.
of 1776, art. XVIII, §§ 9, 10 (1837).
64. See Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. II, § 5; ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. IIl, §§ 8, 9; Miss.
CONST. of 1832, art. III, §§ 8, 9.
65. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § XI; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. I, § HI, art.
II; VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § VII; VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 7; CONN. CONST. of 1818,
art. III,§ 3.
66. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. III (counties and towns); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9
(towns, wards); VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, §§ 2, 4 (counties, cities, towns, boroughs); R.I.
CONST. art. V, § 1 (towns and cities).
67. See S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 3; MD. CONST. of 1776, art. VI, § 1 (1799); MD.
CONST. of 1776, art. X (1807); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 3 (1808).
68. See PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 17 (counties and city of Philadelphia); S.C. CONST.
of 1776, art. XI (parishes and districts); S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XIII (parishes and districts);
N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9; MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. HI, §§ 8, 9; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II,
§§ 3, 5 (counties and districts); ME. CONST. of 1819, art. IV, pt. 1st, §§ 2, 3 (counties, towns,
and districts); TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. II, § 5 (counties and districts); MICH. CONST. of
1835, art. IV, § 3 (counties and districts); MASS. CONST. amend, art. XII (1836) (towns, cities,
districts); MASS. CONST. amend. art. XIII (1840) (towns, cities, districts).
69. See ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. IX, § 2 (counties); ARK. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(counties); DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. II, § 2 (counties); FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. VH, § 3
(counties); GA. CONST. of 1877, art. III, § III, para. I (counties); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 16
(parishes); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9 (towns, wards); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, § III, para. 1
(counties); N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 5 (counties); R.I. CONST. art. V, § 1 (towns, cities);
S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 4 (counties); VT. CONST. of 1793, ch. II, § 7 (towns). By 1913,
one scholar could write that "[t]he dominant tendency is clearly in favor of single member
districts unconnected with any other civil division. The county is no longer favored as an
apportionment unit." Chester Lloyd Jones, The County in Politics, 47 ANNALS AM. AcAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 85, 88 (1913).
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desire to maintain population equality among represented units; concentrated
population increases in certain regions could be accommodated by permitting
the division of large counties into districts,7 ° and acceptable ratios of
representation across counties could be maintained by permitting counties in
sparsely populated or slow-growing areas to be combined into multicounty
districts.7 1
With respect to state senates, or upper chambers, the earliest state
constitutions generally also designated counties as the basic unit of
representation,7 2 but the movement toward the use of districts for senate
representation occurred much earlier, gathering momentum as early as the
1790s. So, for example, the Tennessee Constitution of 1796 and the
Kentucky Constitution of 1799 employed districts as the unit of senatorial
representation while basing representation in the house on counties, and the
New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 (as amended in 1792) similarly
bifurcated between districts for the senate and towns for the house.73 After
about 1800, the use of counties or other local government units as the basis
of senatorial representation declined rapidly, and the district became the
representational unit of choice.74 The evident reason for this change was to
preserve the small size of state senates by permitting representation from
multicounty senatorial districts. As settlement proceeded and state population
grew, an insistence upon separate senatorial representation for each county
might well have required either a considerably larger senate than
70. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 33 (permitting division of multi-representative counties into
districts); Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. IV, § 2 (requiring such division).
71. In some instances as many as seven counties might be combined into a single
representative district. See, e.g., KAN. CONST. art. 10, § 3 (1859).
72. See, e.g., MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV (counties and cities); N.J. CONST. of 1776,
art. III (counties); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. II (counties); GA. CONST. of 1789, art. I, § 2
(counties); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 3 (counties); KY. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 9

(counties).
73. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. I, §§ 2, 3; Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. II, §§ 5, 12; N.H.

CONST. pt. II, arts. 9 (house), 26 (1792 amendment providing for the formation of singlemember senate districts).
74. After 1799, only a handful of senatorial apportionment provisions continued to
insist on the election of senators from individual local units. For example, between 1799 and
1867, only five states adopted such provisions. See DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. II, § 3
(counties); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 3, § 31 (counties); MD. CONST. art. III, § 3 (setting the
representation of the counties and "each of the three legislative districts of the city of
Baltimore," prior to 1972 amendment); MD. CONST. of 1864, art. III, § 3 (counties and
Baltimore); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 2 (counties and Baltimore); MD. CONST. of 1776,
art. XVIII, § 3 (1837) (counties and Baltimore); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, § II, para. 1

(counties); R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (towns and cities).
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constitutional drafters desired, or serious population inequities across
represented counties. The switch to districts addressed both problems at
once.
Generally speaking, the use of districts as the representational unit rather
than local governments gives legislatures greater flexibility in structuring
representation, but of course, that very flexibility also creates opportunities
for manipulation. Within these parameters, legislators seeking to influence
electoral outcomes can create election districts either by subdividing
populous local government units such as counties or by aggregating
underpopulated local government units together; but in each case, legislators
may have considerable discretion about how to perform the necessary
subdivision or aggregation.
For example, the eponymous Massachusetts gerrymander of 1812 was
made possible by the terms of the Massachusetts Constitution, which
provided that senators were "to be chosen by the Inhabitants of the districts,
into which the commonwealth may from time to time be divided by the
[legislature]. '7 Although the constitution also provided that senatorial
districts would coincide with the various counties as an initial matter, it
permitted departures when "the [legislature] shall determine it necessary to
alter the said districts. 76 Since the constitution's adoption in 1780, the
legislature had not departed from the constitution's initial structuring of
senatorial districts. In the 1812 session, however, a legislature controlled by
Republicans divided Essex County into two senatorial election districts, and
reallocated the town of Chelsea, located in neighboring Suffolk County, to
one of the new Essex County districts. The purpose of this legislation was to
carve out of Essex County, solidly Federalist in the 1811 elections, new
districts that would elect several Republican state senators.77
On the other hand, it would be wrong to conclude that constitutionally
requiring election districts to be fashioned from whole local government
units precludes any kind of gerrymandering. It does not. Unless the
boundaries of local governments are themselves fixed permanently by the
constitution-virtually never the case 78 - legislatures can gerrymander in at

75. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. I, § II, art. I (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. See BILLIAS, supra note 8, at 316-17; GRIFFITH, supra note 8, at 19-20, 64-74.
78. For example, the Alabama Constitution of 1875 provided: "The boundaries of the
several counties of this State, as heretofore established by law, are hereby ratified and
confirmed." ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 2. However, the provision went on to permit
alteration of existing county boundaries by two-thirds vote of the legislature. Id. The Hawaii
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least two ways. First, they can simply by law alter the boundaries of existing
counties or municipalities. This occurred in 1816, for example, when the
Maryland legislature increased the size, and thus the population, of the City
of Baltimore without providing it with any additional representatives; as a
result, Baltimore gained a population equivalent to that of a county, but
under constitutional rules was entitled to only half as many representatives.79
Similarly, in 1824, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a law removing a
portion of the town of Dighton and reassigning it to the neighboring town of
Wellington to secure a Republican representative from both.8 °
Second, even when election districts correspond to local government
units, unless the number of localities is constitutionally fixed-again, almost
never the case-legislatures can manipulate representation simply by
creating new counties or towns. This also occurred, for example, in the
Massachusetts legislative session of 1812, when the legislature carved the
new, Republican-leaning towns of South Reading and North Brookfield out
of the existing, solidly Federalist towns of Reading and Brookfield. 81 Two
new towns-two new representatives.
B. RepresentationAllocation Rules
Once the unit of representation has been specified, the next question is
how to allot representatives among the units entitled to legislative
representation. In the Anglo-American tradition, the legislative lower
chamber has generally been understood as the organ of government in which
the people are most immediately represented, and representation in lower
chambers has therefore generally been linked more or less directly to

Constitution creates permanent representational units known as "basic island units," which are
comprised of combinations of whole islands. HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
79. GRiFFITH, supra note 8, at 94. However, linking election districts to towns had the
anomalous effect of making every alteration of town boundaries, including relatively routine
actions such as annexation, into reapportionments. In Maine and Massachusetts, this meant
that alterations to town and county lines had to be made in conformity with the constitutional
requirements of apportionment. See Opinion of the Justices, 33 Me. 587 (1851) (holding that
the legislature could not alter town boundaries except at the time of reapportionment); Warren
v. Mayor of Charleston, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 101-04 (1854) (invalidating annexation of
Charleston by Boston on similar grounds).
80. See GRIFFrH, supra note 8, at 102.
81. See id. at 73.
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population.82 The critical question has always been how best to accomplish
this goal.
The earliest American state constitutions tended to use fixed allocation
rules to determine the number of representatives to which each represented
unit-as indicated above, typically a county-was entitled. Thus, for
example, the Delaware Constitution of 1776 allocated seven representatives
to each county, the New Jersey Constitution of 1776 allocated three
representatives to each county, the Virginia Constitution of 1776 entitled
each county to elect two representatives, and so on. 83 Unless population
growth is relatively uniform across the state, however, this method will soon
lead to large disparities in population, and the states, probably as a result,
soon abandoned the fixed allocation method in favor of allowing the number
of representatives to which a represented unit was entitled to float with its
population.
The most common approach, clearly the consensus choice by the 1830s
or 1840s, was to allocate representation in the lower house purely on the
basis of population. The Kentucky Constitution of 1799, for example,
provided that representatives "shall be apportioned . . .among the several
counties and towns in proportion to the number of qualified electors";84 the
Indiana Constitution of 1816 similarly provided that representatives be
"apportioned among the several counties, according to the number of white
male inhabitants, above twenty-one years of age in each. 85
82. Britain's so-called "rotten boroughs" are of course the great counter-example, see,
e.g., GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL
POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT 15-16 (1966), but the fact that they were considered
illegitimate deviations demonstrates the general proposition that population was viewed, or at
least eventually came to be viewed, as the proper principle for representation in the Commons.
Some of the worst inequities of Britain's rotten boroughs were mitigated by the Reform Act of
1832. For an account, see J.R. POLE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN ENGLAND AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 494-99 (1966).
83. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 3; N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. III; VA. CONST. of 1776, para.
25; see also MD. CONST. of 1776, arts. II, IV, V (four per county, two for Annapolis and
Baltimore); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. III (two per county, one for each of six named towns);
§ 17 (six per county and Philadelphia); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II,
PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II,
§ XVI (one per town).
84. KY. CONST. of 1799, art. II, § 6.
85. IND. CONST. of 1816, art. III, § 2; see also TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. I, § 2
("number of taxable inhabitants"); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, amend. 11 (1801) ("number of
electors"); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. I, § 2 ("number of white male inhabitants above twentyone years of age"); LA. CONST. of 1812, art. II, § 6 ("number of qualified electors"); MISS.
CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 9 ("number of free white inhabitants"); ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II,
§ 5 ("number of white inhabitants"); TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. II, § 5 ("number of qualified
voters"); ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 34 ("number of free white male inhabitants"); PA.
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The problem with allowing the number of representatives to float freely
with population, however, is that it can lead, as population increases, to an
unwanted and potentially rapid expansion in the size of the legislature. To
hold the line on legislative size, some states chose to sacrifice strict
population equity across represented units. One common method was to
require ever larger population increments to qualify for additional
representatives. Under Missouri's 1875 Constitution, for example, a "ratio of
representation" was calculated by dividing the population of the state by two
hundred. Each county having one ratio of representation, or less, was entitled
to one representative in the state house of representatives. To earn a second
representative, however, a county needed a population of two-and-one-half
ratios. A third representative was allowed to counties having a population of
four ratios, a fourth to counties with six ratios, and so on.86 Another common
method of restraining growth in the size of lower houses was to impose caps
on the number of representatives to which represented units were entitled.
Thus, under the Georgia Constitution of 1798, counties were entitled to
between one and four representatives depending upon their population, but
no amount of population could entitle a county to more than four
representatives.87 Under the Vermont Constitution of 1786 and an 1874
amendment to the Connecticut Constitution, towns were entitled to either one
or two representatives-but never more than two-again according to their
population.8 8
Although neither of these methods requires drawing or redrawing a
single election district line, both methods are, of course, a kind of
gerrymander in favor of less populous areas--or to put it less pejoratively,
both allocation formulae give significant weight to considerations other than
population. Moreover, these kinds of restraints on the size of legislative
delegations were not always imposed equitably, even on their own terms;
sometimes they were deployed selectively, and the most frequent victims,
especially as the nineteenth century wore on, were large cities. For example,
under the Maryland Constitution of 1851, Baltimore was limited to "four
more delegates than are allowed to the most populous county,' 89 regardless
CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 4 ("number of taxable inhabitants"); TEX.CONST. of 1845, art. III, §
29 ("number of free population"); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 3, § 31 ("number of white
inhabitants"); WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. IV, § 3 ("number of inhabitants").
86. Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, § 2; see also MD. CONST. of 1864, art. III, § 4; MD.
CONST. art. HII, § 4 (1867, pre-1972 amendment); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9 (1877 amendment).
87. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 7.
88. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. H, § VII; CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. XV (1874).
89. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 3.
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of its actual population. Under the Rhode Island Constitution of 1842, no
town or city, regardless of its population, was entitled to more than one-sixth
of the total9 1number of representatives, 90 a restriction doubtless aimed at
Providence.
The evolution of representation allocation provisions follows a similar
pattern for state senates, but with two main-and conflicting-differences.
First, state constitutions started to converge on population as the preferred
method for allocating senators around 1800, several decades earlier than was
the case with representatives. As indicated in the previous section, state
constitutions began to converge during the 1790s on the use of districts as the
basic unit of senatorial representation, a shift that allowed state legislatures
more readily to maintain population equality among senatorial districts by
disengaging them from local government units, such as counties and towns,
which often contained widely disparate populations. At the same time,
however, state constitutional drafters were much more ready to sacrifice
population equality among senatorial districts for the sake of keeping the
body small than was the case with state legislative lower chambers, for
which a larger number of representatives was preferred.
The tension between these two conflicting impulses was most often
resolved by granting the legislature the discretion to create senatorial
districts, but constraining its discretion by defining senatorial districts as
composites of fixed local government units, most often counties. Perhaps the
most common approach of this kind was to prohibit the division of counties
in the formation of senatorial districts,92 or to require affirmatively that
senatorial districts be "bounded by county lines." 93 Most state constitutions,
moreover, established a provisional set of districts and apportionment of
90. R.I. CONST. art. V, § 1; see also LA. CONST. of 1845, tit. II, art. 15 ("no parish shall
be entitled to more than one-eighth of the whole number of senators"). For a discussion of the
impact of this kind of provision (and other kinds) on apportionment in the mid-twentieth
century, see generally Malcolm E. Jewell, Constitutional Provisions for State Legislative
Apportionment, 8 W. POL. Q. 271 (1955).
91. In 1840, Providence had a population of just over 23,000, see CAMPBELL GIBSON,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WORKING PAPER No. 27, POPULATION OF THE 100 LARGEST CITIES AND
OTHER URBAN PLACES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1790 TO 1990, at tbl.7 (1998), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/documentation/twps0027/tab07.txt, and the entire state of
Rhode Island had a population of nearly 109,000, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION:
1790 TO 1990, http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-16.pdf, which would
ordinarily have entitled Providence to about one-fifth of the state's legislators.
92. E.g., ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 11; MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 13; Mo.
CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 6.
93. W. VA. CONST. of 1862, art. IV, § 4; see also ME. CONST. of 1819, art. IV, pt. 2d, §
2 (senatorial districts to be formed of whole counties "as near as may be").
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legislators, subject to alteration following the next census after ratification of
the constitution, and the overwhelming majority of these initial
apportionments created senatorial districts out of one or more whole
counties.94 This exceedingly common practice also suggests strongly that
state constitutional drafters generally contemplated that legislatures would
maintain population equality across senatorial districts primarily by
aggregating counties in combinations that produced roughly equitable
results. The responsibility to aggregate counties into senatorial districts in
this way, however, obviously left state legislatures with considerable
discretion that they might exercise for partisan purposes; counties might be
grouped this way rather than that, with presumably predictable
consequences.
C. Size of the Legislature
Before 1800, state constitutions rarely fixed the number of legislators to
be elected; instead, this figure floated freely with the number of
representatives to which the various represented units cumulatively were
entitled. For example, if the constitutional formula for allocating
representatives allotted one senator per county,95 the number of legislators
depended solely on the number of counties rather than on the size of the
population represented or on any deliberate determination about the most
desirable size of the legislature. As we have seen, this kind of allocation
formula created opportunities for gerrymandering by permitting the
legislature to create new counties or towns which were then entitled under
the formula to separate representation. On the other hand, the proliferation of
new units of local government accompanying new settlement often placed
unwanted upward pressure on the size of the legislature.
Between 1800 and about 1880, the most common state constitutional
approach to this dilemma was to establish a range-a minimum and
maximum size-for one or both legislative chambers, and to authorize the
legislature to establish by law the precise number of legislators within the
range. For example, an 1801 amendment to the New York Constitution of
1777 provided: "[T]he number of the members of the assembly hereafter to
be elected shall be one hundred, and shall never exceed one hundred and
fifty"; 96 the Missouri Constitution of 1820 established a senate of between
94.
IV, § 31;
95.
96.

Among the dozens of examples of this practice are, e.g., ARK. CONST. of 1836, art.
FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § 5; TEx. CONST. of 1845, art. III, § 32.
E.g., GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 3.
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, amend. 1 (1801).
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fourteen and thirty-three members; 97 and the Michigan Constitution of 1835
98
required a house of between forty-eight and one hundred representatives.
A common variation on this approach, first appearing in Tennessee in
1796 and increasingly common by the 1830s, was to establish a numerical
range for the house, but to set the size of the senate as a ratio, or a range of
ratios, of the size of the house. Thus, under the Tennessee provision, the
number of representatives was to be set by the legislature between twentytwo and twenty-six, 99 and "[t]he number of senators shall... be fixed by the
legislature ... and shall never be less than one-third nor more than one-half
° The Mississippi Constitution of 1832
of the number of representatives."'0
established a house of between thirty-six and one hundred representatives,
and a senate of between one-fourth and one-third the number of
representatives. 10'
In the newer and less densely populated states, state constitutions
sometimes set two ranges in anticipation of population increases. The Iowa
Constitution of 1846, for example, provided: "the house of representatives
shall never be less than twenty-six, nor greater than thirty-nine, until the
number of white inhabitants shall be one hundred and seventy-five thousand;
and after that event, at such ratio such that the whole number of
shall never be less than thirty-nine nor exceeding seventyrepresentatives
2
10

two.'

By allowing the size of the legislature to vary, but only within a
predetermined range, all of these approaches successfully mediated between
competing public interests in population equality, and a reasonable
legislative size in relation to represented population. The constitutional
ceiling on the number of representatives prevented the legislature from
growing so large as to cultivate what James Madison called "the confusion of
a multitude.' 0 3 At the same time, permitting the size of the legislature to
vary considerably beneath the ceiling created the flexibility necessary to
distribute representatives among represented units in a way that

97. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 6.
98. MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. IV, § 2.
99. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. I, § 2.
100. Id. § 3.
101.
Miss. CONST. of 1832, art. III, §§ 9, 10.
102. IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 3, § 31.
103. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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corresponded--certainly roughly, but doubtless in many cases with some fair
degree of accuracy-to their populations.'04
On the other hand, any detail not specified by the state constitution is one
necessarily left to the legislature, 10 5 and leaving to the legislature the task of
determining its own size created opportunities for gerrymandering. For a
legislature of any size below the constitutional cap, the question always
arises whether the legislature might profitably be increased in size by one
additional representative. No matter what the constitutional formula for
allocating representatives among represented units, legislators will either
have some discretion about where to add the additional representative, or, if
they lack such discretion, will certainly know to which county, town, or
district the next representative must be allocated-and the one after that, and
the one after that. In consequence, decisions concerning legislative size are
inevitably highly politicized. 1 6

104. While not exactly relevant, it is perhaps worth noting that population equality
among congressional districts was greater during the mid-nineteenth century than at any other
time in United States history. See Micah Altman, TraditionalDistrictingPrinciples: Judicial
Myths vs. Reality, 22 Soc. ScI. HIST. 159, 173-79 (1998). The number of representatives per
state could not, of course, be varied by the state legislature to resolve population inequality
across districts, but this fact may indicate a general desire among nineteenth-century state
legislatures to honor population equality when possible to do so.
105. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions are generally understood to
provide general grants of legislative authority except as limited in the document.
Consequently, where state constitutions are silent about the existence of a power, state
legislatures are assumed to possess it. See TARR, supra note 13, at 7-8.
106. For example, following the 1920 census, separate proposals were made in
Congress to increase the size of the House of Representatives from 435 members to 450, 460,
and 483, as well as to decrease it to 300, 304, and even 65. See generally CHARLES W.
EAGLES,

DEMOCRACY DELAYED: CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT AND URBAN-RURAL

CONFLICT INTHE 1920s, at 32-84 (1990). The impact that these proposals would have had on
the size of each state's legislative delegation caused such bitter infighting that Congress was
unable to enact any reapportionment law at all based on the 1920 census-a direct violation of
the Constitution-and managed in 1929 to agree only on a reapportionment method to apply
to the 1930 census. Id. The tenor of the debate can be gleaned from the following passage:
Maine Republican Carroll L. Beedy, a member of the Census Committee, accused the
committee members of having abandoned principle in favor of protecting their own
seats. Beedy opposed the Siegel bill [which would have increased the size of the
house to 460 members] and questioned, "By what process of ratiocination did the
committee conclude to increase the membership of the House but to put the brakes at
460?" He explained that the committee contained two powerful congressmen from
Kentucky and Iowa-John W. Langley, an eight-term veteran from Pikeville,
Kentucky ....

and Iowa's Horace M. Towner ....

Beedy suggested that Langley

"long since discovered that a House of 459 would save Kentucky a Congressman"
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In apparent recognition of this dynamic, by the late nineteenth century
the dominant method for determining legislative size changed again, to the
familiar, modem approach whereby the number of legislators is fixed
directly by the state constitution. For example, the California Constitution of
1879 established a house of eighty and a senate of forty; the Kentucky
Constitution of 1891 established a house of one hundred and a senate of
thirty-eight; and the Delaware Constitution of 1897 created a house of thirtyfive and a senate of seventeen. 10 7 This approach to legislative size takes one
form of discretion to allocate representatives away from the legislature, but
only at the cost of creating a conflict between adhering to local government
lines to define represented units, on one hand, and population equality in
representation, on the other. Under the former system, population
inequalities among counties or towns could be smoothed out by sprinkling a
few additional representatives where they were most needed. If each
chamber must be of a fixed size, however, population inequality can no
longer be addressed by the discretionary addition of representatives, leaving
the full burden of smoothing out population inequality to either the
constitutional formula for allocating representatives, or to the discretionary
grouping of local government units into districts by the legislature. The
former were generally too blunt to eliminate substantial malapportionment,
and the latter returned authority to the legislature that it might abuse for
partisan purposes.
D. Method of Election: Single-Member or Multimember Districts
The use of counties and towns as units of representation, coupled with
the widespread use of population as the preferred criterion for allocating
representatives among them, often meant that individual, represented units
were entitled to more than one representative or senator. This required that a
choice be made between subdividing the unit and electing legislators
individually from single-member districts, or electing the entire legislative
and that Towner similarly knew that "a House of 460 would save Iowa a
Congressman."
Id. at 49. A bill recently introduced in Congress, albeit of doubtful constitutionality, would
increase the size of the House of Representatives by two, with one member going to the
District of Columbia and the next to Utah. Mary Beth Sheridan, House Panel Endorses D.C.
Vote; Bill Needs Approval from Judiciary Committee, WASH. POST, May 19, 2006, at B 1. This
measure obviously represents a political compromise intended to soften long-standing
resistance by Republicans to full D.C. voting rights in Congress. Id.
107. CAL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2(a), 6; Ky. CONST. § 35; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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delegation from a single multimember district, a method now generally
called election at large, but known during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries as the "general ticket."
The choice between these two systems, however, presented a significant
opportunity for a kind of gerrymandering. On one hand, elections at large
tend to overrepresent the majority as compared to election by single-member
districts,108 making it a potentially attractive choice for any party temporarily
in power. On the other hand, at-large systems can magnify small changes in
public opinion into dramatic swings in legislative control, and determining
whether an at-large or single-district system is in the long-term interest of
any party requires rather fine calculations about the geographical distribution
of supporters and the likely success of party candidates in future elections. In
any event, opportunistic switching between these two systems was common
during the early nineteenth century, especially for the election of
congressional delegations and slates of presidential electors. New
Hampshire, for example, switched its mode of electing congressional
representatives twice within seven months in 1824-25, from general ticket to
single-member districts in late 1824, and back to a general ticket the
following July, as control of the state legislature changed hands. 1°9 New
Jersey elected its congressional delegation by general ticket before 1798;
switched to districted elections for the election of 1798; returned to the
general ticket for elections between 1800 and 1810; used districts in 1812;
and elected by general ticket from 1814 through 1826, all depending upon
how the party in control of the state legislature assessed its political
fortunes. 10

108. This is because political minorities may be sufficiently numerous to control the
outcome in one or several election districts, but not sufficiently numerous to control the
outcome throughout the jurisdiction. As a result, under an at-large electoral system, it is
theoretically possible for 51% of the populace to control the outcomes for 100% of the seats.
That is why one of the first institutions to fall under the Voting Rights Act after its 1982
amendment was the use of at-large legislative districts. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 46-52 (1986). As Justice O'Connor observed, at-large elections have a tendency to
"submerge" racial minorities. See id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he
at-large or multimember district has an inherent tendency to submerge the votes of the
minority."). Indeed, where at-large systems have been used for discriminatory purposes,
division of the multimember jurisdiction into equipopulous districts has long been the Court's
remedy of choice. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1975); Mahan v. Howell, 410
U.S. 315, 333 (1973); Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 551 (1972) (per curiam); Connor v.
Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971) (per curiam).
109. See GRIFFrrH,supra note 8, at 101-02.
110. See ZAGARRI, supra note 28, at 115-17.
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For state legislative elections, the dominant approach until about the
middle of the nineteenth century was to require multimember districts for
both chambers, although a minority of states used single-member districts to
elect senators. In 1842, for example, every state elected representatives by
general ticket, and seventeen out of twenty-seven elected senators by general
ticket as well."' In a typical case, the election of representatives by general
ticket meant that a particular county might elect, say, two or three
representatives at large. In some cases, the number of representatives elected
by general ticket could be considerably larger; for example, the South
Carolina Constitution of 1868 allocated eighteen representatives to
Charleston County and the Nevada
Constitution of 1864 allocated twelve
12
representatives to Storey County."
In 1842, Congress passed the Apportionment Act," 3 requiring all
congressional representatives to be elected from single-member districts.
This halted the practice of opportunistic switching between at-large and
districted congressional elections. At the same time, however, compliance
with the Apportionment Act required all states to draw congressional
election districts, thereby opening the door to the kind of line-drawing
gerrymanders prevalent today. It is ironic that this federal law, enacted
originally at least in part to put a stop to one kind of very potent
manipulation of the rules of representation," 4 created the conditions that
today enable a very different kind of manipulation.
111.
In reaching this result, I count among the general-ticket states those that
authorized the creation of single-legislator districts for the least populous units if other units
were entitled to more than one legislator based on their greater populations. In a populationbased system of district elections by general ticket, there is no logical requirement that every
district have more than one representative. Most systems were of this sort; very few
affirmatively required more than one representative or senator in every district. For a rare
example, see CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. II (1828) ("no county shall have less than two
senators").
The ten states that elected senators from single-member districts were Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and Virginia. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I1, § 10; FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, § 2; GA.
CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 3 (1843); KY. CONST. of 1799, art. II, § 14; MD. CONST. of 1776, art.
XVIII, § 3 (1837); N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, § lI, para. 1; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 1
(1835); R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 1; S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 3 (1808); VA. CONST. of 1830,
art. III, § 3.
112. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 4; NEv. CONST. art. XVII, § 6.
113. Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491.
114. The other reason had to do with the politics of slavery. Given the antebellum
division of public opinion in the North over slavery, Southern politicians generally believed
that if northern elections were held by district, it was likely that a good number of northern
legislators would not support measures to end slavery. A requirement of single-member
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Although the Apportionment Act applied only to representation in
Congress, it seems to have precipitated a gradual shift in state approaches
toward the use of single-member districts for elections to both chambers of
the state legislature. Single-member districting for both chambers was
constitutionally adopted, for example, in New York (1846), Wisconsin
(1848), Michigan (1850), Kansas (1858), Missouri (1875), California (1879),
and Kentucky (1891),115 although multimember districts continued to be
6
widely utilized in many states well into the twentieth century. 1
Nevertheless, constitutional authority to utilize single-member districts
was typically granted subject to constraints, mainly because it conflicted with
the almost universally accepted principle that local government units should
be kept intact for purposes of representation. Single-member districting was
therefore authorized only when necessary to subdivide counties, and later
cities, into districts when their population entitled them to more than one
representative. The result was a two-stage process in which legislators were
first allocated to whole represented units, such as counties or cities, and these
larger units were then subdivided into a number of election districts equal to
their allocation of legislators.' 1 7 For example, the Michigan Constitution of
1850 provided: "In every county entitled to more than one Representative,
the board of supervisors [of the county] shall assemble . . .and divide the
same into representative districts, equal to the number of Representatives to
which such county is entitled by law . . . .""' At no time before the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Reynolds v. Sims 1 9 did state constitutions
districts would thus preserve a pro-slavery majority in Congress. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 27th
Cong., 21st Sess. 448 (Apr. 27, 1842) (statement of Rep. Garrett Davis); id. at 464 (May 2,
1842) (statement of Rep. Wm.Cost Johnson); id. at 469, 470 (May 3, 1842) (statement of
Rep. Ferris); id. at 567-68 (June 2, 1842) (statement of Sen. Woodbury); see also ZAGARRI,
supra note 28, at 140.
115. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. III, §§ 3, 5; WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. IV, §§ 4, 5;
MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, §§ 2, 3; KAN. DRAFT [LEAVENWORTH] CONST. of 1858, art. IV,
§ 3; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. IV, §§ 3, 5, 6; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 6; Ky. CONST. § 31.
116. West Virginia to this day elects senators from two-senator districts. W. VA.
CONST. art. VI, § 4. Arizona elects two representatives from each state house district. ARIz.
CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(1).
117. This method is familiar on the federal level as well. Under the U.S. Constitution,
Representatives are allocated among the states on the basis of population. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
2, cl. 1, amend. XIV, § 2. Under the Apportionment Act of 1842, the states are then divided
into the appropriate number of districts. Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491.
118. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, § 3; see also Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. II, § 5
(multi-representative cities to be divided into equal districts); N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. III, §
5 (board of supervisors to divide multi-member counties into equal districts).
119. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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authorize the creation 20of single-member districts that crossed local
government boundaries.
Finally, the constitutional choice between single-member and
multimember districts was not always made in a way that applied the same
rules to all represented units. One such practice was to adopt different rules
for counties and large cities in ways evidently intended to disadvantage the
latter. For example, an 1857 amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1838 provided that "no county shall be divided in the formation of a
[representative] district," but that "[a]ny city containing a sufficient
[population] to entitle it to at least two representatives, shall have a separate
representation assigned it, and shall be divided into convenient districts...
each of which districts shall elect one representative." 12 To drive the point
home, the amendment went on to provide: "The city of Philadelphia shall be
divided into single senatorial districts .... ,,22 This arrangement doubtless
was thought to strengthen the influence of counties in the legislature by
uniting their delegations and to weaken the influence of cities by splitting
them. 123
E. Direct Restrictions on Gerrymandering
We have seen thus far that constitutional systems of legislative
representation contain a host of variables, and that many of these variables,
such as units of representation, representative allocation rules, the size of the
legislature, and the type of electoral system, may be manipulated
opportunistically by legislative majorities to enhance their power without
ever drawing or altering a single district boundary line-without, that is,
engaging in what we would be inclined today to call overt gerrymandering.
Nevertheless, the manipulation of district lines is a tool that has often been
120. This does not, of course, mean that it was not done. For example, "the Wisconsin
Constitution had for over 40 years been interpreted by the Wisconsin Legislature as permitting
Assembly districts to cross county lines before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1892 ruled
that county lines had to be regarded as inviolable in the first Cunningham case." H. Rupert
Theobald, Equal Representation:A Study of Legislative and CongressionalApportionment in
Wisconsin, in STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 71, 204 (1970). The case referred to is State

ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724 (Wis. 1892).
121. PA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 4 (1857).
122. Id. §7.
123. During the nineteenth century, states that elected congressional delegations (or
slates of presidential electors) at large were sometimes said to have more influence than, or
disproportionate influence compared to, states that elected by district. See ZAGARRI, supra
note 28, at 130-33.
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available to state legislatures, and provisions have frequently been placed in
state constitutions for the purpose of constraining directly the practice of
gerrymandering in its narrowest, contemporary sense-as a form of
manipulation of election district boundaries. I therefore turn finally to this
family of direct anti-gerrymandering constraints.
The most basic method of preventing legislative gerrymandering is
simply constitutional specification: the more the state constitution says about
how districts are to be structured, the less discretion the legislature has, and
thus the more limited its opportunities to gerrymander. The most extreme
and therefore foolproof version of constitutional specification is to
constitutionalize the actual boundaries of all legislative election districts,
thereby depriving the legislature of all discretion whatsoever. This has been
done on a few occasions. The Delaware Constitution of 1897, for example,
specified the precise boundaries of all thirty-five house and all seventeen
senatorial districts, down to the level of individual streets,1 24 but this is an
extremely rare strategy, and one that suffers heavily from all the
disadvantages associated with constitutional overspecification, including
inflexibility
and,
often,
rapid
obsolescence.1 25 Moreover,
the
constitutionalization of district boundaries hardly means that inequitable
representation will never be created under the constitutional scheme; it
means only that any such inequities will be created by the constitutional
convention rather than the legislature.
A much more common approach to constraining gerrymandering was to
constitutionalize constraints on the ways in which legislative districts could
be drawn by the apportioning legislature. The very first provision
establishing restrictions on the exercise of legislative discretion in district
line-drawing appeared surprisingly early, in the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1790. This provision contained two restrictions that were subsequently
widely copied by other states. It provided, first, that "[w]hen a district shall
be composed of two or more counties they shall be adjoining"; and second,
124. DEL. CONST. art. II, § 2. In some cases, state constitutions even defined districts in
reference to individual dwellings. The Kansas Constitution of 1855 defined one district's
boundary by "a direct line to the west side of Johnson's house," and another as lying along a
line "on the east side of the house of Charles Matney." KAN. DRAFT [TOPEKA] CONST. of 1855,
sched. 6th, 1st dist., 3d dist. Unlike the Delaware districts, however, the districts so defined
could be altered by the legislature. Id.
125. Constitutional overspecification has a long history among state constitutions. For
critique, see Charles R. Adrian, Trends in State Constitutions,5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311, 323
(1968); William F. Swindler, State Constitutionsfor the 20th Century, 50 NEB. L. REv. 577,
590-99 (1971); Note, California'sConstitutionalAmendonania, 1 STAN. L. REv. 279, 280-81
(1949).

20061

FOREWORD

that "[n]either the city
of Philadelphia, nor any county, shall be divided in
126
forming a district."'
The appearance in this constitution of a requirement that counties in the
same district be "adjoining" is itself somewhat surprising in that there does
not seem to be any evidence to suggest that the requirement responded to any
specific problem in Pennsylvania-or in any other state, for that matterprior to 1790 involving the formation of legislative districts out of
nonadjoining counties. In The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander,
which covers line-drawing chicanery from colonial times until 1842, Elmer
C. Griffith reports exactly one example of the formation of a state legislative
district out of nonadjoining counties. The example turns out to be from
Pennsylvania, but it dates from 1829-nearly
forty years after the initial
27
adoption of the constitutional prohibition. 1
The genesis of Pennsylvania's prohibition on dividing counties is also
somewhat murky. Griffith reports that some counties in Pennsylvania had
been divided into election districts in 1785 and restored the following year, 2 8
but finds no hard evidence to suggest either that the division was made for
partisan purposes, or that the 1790 prohibition on dividing counties was
adopted specifically to prevent gerrymandering. 29 The only evidence on this
point is very indirect: during the Pennsylvania constitutional convention of
1837-nearly fifty years after the fact-one delegate referred to the
130
prohibition on dividing counties as a device to prevent gerrymandering.
On the other hand, counties had been divided in New York in 1789 in
drawing congressional election districts 31 -the first instance since 1776 in
any state, according to Griffith, of the division of political units in such

126. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 7. The provision was by its own terms limited to
senatorial districts, and no similar restriction applied to representative districts.
127. According to Griffith, in 1829 the Pennsylvania legislature created a senatorial
district out of three counties in the central part of the state: Lycoming, Centre, and
Northumberland. See GRIFITH,supra note 8, at 115. Lycoming and Northumberland Counties
share a border, but Centre County misses touching Lycoming by about 1.5 miles according to
present-day maps.
128. Id. at45.
129. Id. at44.
130. Id. at45.
131. Id. at 42. Westchester County was split up between the second and third
congressional districts. See KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF UNITED STATES
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 1789-1983, at 247 (Kenneth C. Martis & Ruth Anderson Rowles
eds., 1982) (citing Cong. Dist. Law, C. 12 (Jan. 27, 1789)). The county's boundaries were
quite different then than they are today. See ATLAS OF HISTORICAL COUNTY BOUNDARIES: NEW
YORK 207-09 (Kathryn Ford Thome compiler, John H. Long ed., 1993).
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districting 3 2-but if the 1790 Pennsylvania prohibition on dividing counties
was meant as a response to this episode, it was poorly crafted indeed, for it
applied only to state senatorial districts and not to congressional districts at
all. In fact, just one year later, in 1791, the Pennsylvania legislature did, in
drawing congressional districts, precisely what the state constitution forbade
it to do in drawing state senatorial districts: it divided a county by joining the
city of Philadelphia, a part of Philadelphia County, with Delaware County to
make one congressional district and by133joining the rest of Philadelphia
County to Bucks County to make another.
In the end, then, we can be certain, at most, of two things. First, there can
be no doubt that both of the techniques banned by the 1790 Pennsylvania
Constitution could have been used opportunistically, and that prohibiting
them deprived the legislature of two potential tools of gerrymandering.
Second, the prohibition on dividing counties is consistent with what we have
already seen over and over in examining state constitutional structures of
representation: outside of New England, the basic unit of legislative
representation was widely understood throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries to be the county. Thus, even if it did not respond to
some specific instance of line-drawing malfeasance, the 1790 Pennsylvania
prohibition on dividing counties certainly responded to the belief that
counties-or at any rate, county populations-were discrete and whole
entities entitled individually to separate representation in the legislature.
In any event, whatever its motivations, Pennsylvania's 1790 antigerrymandering provisions proved influential in the spread and evolution of
state constitutional constraints on gerrymandering. Language requiring
counties within an election district to be "adjoining" percolated slowly
through the state constitutional world, turning up, for example, in Tennessee
(1796) and Kentucky ( 1 7 9 9 ). 34 A slightly different formulation, first
appearing in Mississippi in 1817, provided: "When a senatorial district shall
be composed of two or more counties, it shall not be entirely separated by
any county belonging to another district ...,. This prohibition on districts
containing "entirely separated" counties later turned up in the constitutions

132. See GRIFFITH, supra note 8, at 42.
133. Id. at 45.
134. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. I, § 4; Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. II, § 12; see also
MASS. CONST. amend, art. XXII (1857) ("adjacent territory").
135. MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. III, § 13.
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of Alabama (1819), Missouri (1820), Florida (1838), and Iowa (1846),136 and
similar provisions banning "separated" counties appeared in Texas (1845)
and California (1849). 137 These formulations, however, were soon overtaken
by different language getting at the same idea: the requirement that senatorial
districts be composed of "contiguous" territory. 138 The contiguity
requirement first appeared in the New York Constitution of 1821,139 and
spread rapidly to Connecticut (1828), Michigan (1835), Arkansas (1836),
Illinois (1848), Wisconsin (1848), Indiana (1851), Pennsylvania (1857), and
numerous other states." 4° Interestingly, at the same time as contiguity
requirements in state legislative districting spread, so did the practice of
cobbling together congressional districts out of noncontiguous counties. In
virtually every Congress between 1793 and 1842, when Congress finally
imposed its own contiguity requirement on congressional districts, 4aat least
a few districts consisted of counties that were noncontiguous. 142 No state
136. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 11; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 6; FLA. CONST.
of 1838, art. IX, § 3; IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 3, § 32; see also FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. IX,
§3.
137. TEx. CONST. of 1845, art. III, § 10; CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 30.
138. There is no similar restriction for house districts, probably because it was
unnecessary given that state house districts tended to be defined as whole counties.
139. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. I, § 6.
140. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 11 (1828); MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. IV, § 6; ARK.
CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 32; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 9; WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. IV,
§ 5; IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 6; PA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 4 (1857). Contiguity
provisions continued to spread, appearing in: MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. IV, § 24; OR. CONST.
art. IV, § 7; MASS. CONST. amend, art. XXI (1857); W. VA. CONST. of 1862, art. IV, § 4; GA.
CONST. of 1868, art. III, § 2; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 5; ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. IX, §
4; COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. V, § 47, and others.
141. Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491, provided: "[I]n every case
where a State is entitled to more than one Representative, the number to which each State
shall be entitled under this apportionment shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous
territory .... "
142. For example, from 1793 to 1799, New York's Third Congressional District
comprised the noncontiguous counties of Richmond and Westchester, and its Seventh
Congressional District consisted of the noncontiguous counties of Rensselaer and Clinton.
MARTIS, supra note 131, at 52-54, 247. North Carolina's Tenth Congressional District
contained noncontiguous counties from 1793 to 1803. Id. at 52-56, 256. Massachusetts' First
and Thirteenth Congressional Districts contained noncontiguous counties from 1803 to 1813.
Id. at 57-61, 235. New York's Second District was noncontiguous from 1823 to 1841. Id. at
67-76, 247. In a few instances, states also complied with the contiguity principle only
technically, by drawing congressional districts that touched at only a single point. This was
the case, for example, with Pennsylvania's Fifth District from 1795 to 1801, id. at 53-55, 263,
and New York's Seventeenth District from 1813 to 1821, id. at 62-65, 247. The great majority
of states, however, never drew any noncontiguous congressional districts. See Altman, supra
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constitutional adjacency or contiguity requirement,
however, applied to
143
congressional districting during this period.
The 1790 Pennsylvania prohibition on the division of counties in
drawing districts also spread rapidly, first to Tennessee (1796), and then to
Kentucky (1799), Mississippi (1817), Alabama (1819), Missouri (1820),
New York (1821), Michigan (1835), 144 and many others, becoming
eventually one of the most frequently adopted anti-gerrymandering
provisions in state constitutional law. The same provision also caught on in
New England, though it had to be adapted to local
circumstances by
145
prohibiting the division of towns rather than counties.
As population density increased in older areas through the nineteenth
century, however, the prohibition on dividing large local political units such
as counties became unwieldy, as it required voters in populous counties to
elect dauntingly large legislative delegations. 146 As a result, the units of local
government to which prohibitions on division extended became smaller. In
New York, for example, the 1846 constitution permitted the division of
populous counties into multiple senatorial districts, 47 but prohibited the
division of towns in the creation of assembly districts. 148 The Michigan
note 104, at 179 ("[W]ith one exception every decadal redistricting between 1789 and 1913
contained at least one district of questionable contiguity.... On the other hand, most of the
noncontiguous districts were concentrated in a few states; of the 43 questionable or
noncontiguous districts in the decadal redistrictings of this period, 16 belonged to New York,
7 to South Carolina, 6 to North Carolina, and 5 to Massachusetts.").
143.
Congress required congressional districts to be contiguous from 1842-50, and
from 1862-1919. LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 134-35
(1941).
144. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. I, § 4; Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. H, § 12; MISS. CONST.
of 1817, art. III, § 13; ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. III, § 11; MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 6;
N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. I, § 6; MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. IV, § 6. Prohibitions on dividing
counties subsequently spread to: ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 32; FLA. CONrST. of 1838, art.
IX, § 3; LA. CONST. of 1845, tit. II, art. 15 ("No parish shall be divided in the formation of a
senatorial district, the parish of Orleans excepted."); IOWA CONST. of 1846, art. 3, § 32; CAL.
CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 30; IND. CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 6 ("[N]o county for senatorial
apportionment shall ever be divided."); IOWA CONST. art. III, § 37; OR. CONST. art. IV, § 7;
COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. V, § 47, and others; see also ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 9
(districts to be "bounded by county lines"); W. VA. CONST. of 1862, art. IV, § 4 (same).
145. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 11 (1828); ME. CONST. of 1819, art. IV, pt. 1st, § 3;
N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 26.
146. In at least one case, as many as eighteen to a single county. See S.C. CoNST. of
1868, art. II, § 4 (Charleston County); see also NEv. CONST. art. XVII, § 6 (twelve
assemblymen allocated to Storey County).
147. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. III, § 4.
148. Id. § 5.
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Constitution of 1850 similarly permitted the subdivision of counties into
senatorial districts, but prohibited the division of towns and cities in the
formation of house districts.149 Kentucky (1850) and Pennsylavania (1857)
required the division of cities into single-member districts, but prohibited the
division of wards in performing the required districting. 150 By 1894, the New
York Constitution had watered down its prohibition on districts that divide
local government units to a ban on the division of city blocks.' 5 1
Another early measure aimed at least in part at gerrymandering
prohibited the creation of new, sparsely populated counties. Such a provision
also appeared for the first time in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790: "no
county hereafter erected, shall be entitled to a separate representation, until a
sufficient number of taxable inhabitants shall be contained within it to entitle
them to one representative."' 152 This provision prevented the practice, alluded
to earlier, of manipulating representation through the opportunistic creation
of new counties which were then entitled to elect representatives under
prevailing constitutional allocation rules. 153 Such prohibitions spread widely;
similar provisions appeared in Kentucky (1792), New York (1821),
Michigan (1835), Arkansas (1836), Georgia (1843), Louisiana (1845),
Missouri (1849), Ohio (1851), and Kansas (1859), among others. 154 An
especially notable version of this prohibition appears in an 1877 amendment
to the New Hampshire Constitution:

149. MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, §§ 2, 3.
150. Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. H, § 5 (creating narrow exception to this rule); PA.
CONST. of 1838, art. I, §§ 4, 7 (1857).
151.
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4, cl. 1.
152. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4.
153. Given that for much of the country's history new counties were most likely to be
created in sparsely populated and frontier areas, it is possible that the adoption of these
provisions also reflects a wish by older, more established, or "eastern" areas of the state to
secure their dominance of state politics, see, e.g., ZAGARRI, supra note 28, at 43, though I have
seen no evidence to this effect.
154. KY. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 6; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. I, § 7; MICH. CONST. of
1835, art. IV, § 4; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 29; GA. CONST. of 1798, art. I, § 3 (1843)
(newly created counties to be annexed to existing counties); LA. CONST. of 1845, tit. II, § 8;
MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III (1849); OIo CONST. art. II, § 30; KAN. CONST. art. IX, § 4; see
also ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. H, § 2; NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. X, § 1; CONN. CONST. of
1818, art. XVIII (1876) (new towns under 2500 residents not entitled to separate
representation); TEx. CONST. art. HI, § 26; IDAHO CONST. art. XVIII, § 4; N.D. CONST. of
1889, art. 10, § 167; S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 3; WYO. CONST. art.
XII, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. VII, § 3; ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. II, § 39.
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Provided, That no town shall be divided, or the boundaries of the wards of
any city so altered, as to increase the number of representatives to which
such town or city may be entitled by the next preceding census: And
providedfurther, That to those towns and cities which since the last census
have been divided, or had their boundaries or ward lines changed, the general
court, in session next before these amendments shall take effect, shall
equitably apportion representation in such manner that the number shall not
be greater than it would have been had no such division or alteration been
1 55

made.

The provision, that is, appears to undo an opportunistic division of towns and
cities into smaller units so as to increase the number of representatives sent
to the legislature by the divided areas.
Several other formulations also sprung up here and there, aimed at
prohibiting the division of local government units to form districts, or
forming districts out of dispersed local government units. The Ohio
Constitution of 1851, for example, contained an apparently unique provision
that provided: "All territory, belonging to a county at the time of any
apportionment, shall, as to the right of representation and suffrage, remain an
integral part thereof, during the decennial period [until the next
apportionment]. ' 5 6 The Maine Constitution of 1819 required senatorial
districts to "conform, as near as may be, to county lines" 1 57 and the

155. N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9 (1877). According to the record of the 1876
constitutional convention, the single most important purpose of the convention was to reduce
the size of the house, which, under the state constitution's system of representation by town,
had become excessively large. Although the delegates did not specifically discuss the provisos
quoted in the text, they clearly did disagree about the impact of proposals to reduce the size of
the house, and in particular whether the impact of reductions would fall more heavily on large
or small jurisdictions. It seems clear, from this debate, that at least some delegates thought that
the larger cities had unfairly and opportunistically divided themselves into wards, an action
that, because wards were treated for purposes of representation as the equivalent of towns, had
the effect of increasing their representation beyond what it would have been had the cities
remained undivided. See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 234 (1877) (remarks of Mr. Marston of Exeter). Representatives from the
large cities argued in response that subdividing the jurisdiction into wards neither increased
representation, nor insulated cities from absorbing a proportionate share of any loss of
delegates associated with the convention's goal of reducing the size of the legislature. See,
e.g., id. at 240-41 (remarks of Mr. Gallinger of Concord).
156. OmOCONST. art. XI, § 10.
157. ME. CONST. of 1819, art. IV, pt. 2d, § 2; see also ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. III, § 9
(senatorial and representative districts to be "bounded by county lines").

2006]

FOREWORD

Wisconsin Constitution of 1848 required assembly
districts "to be bounded
' 58
lines."'
ward
and
town,
precinct,
by county,
However, as we have seen, merely requiring that local units of
government be kept intact and arranged contiguously did not prevent them
from being grouped and regrouped opportunistically, for partisan gain, so
restrictions also eventually arose on the shapes into which legislatures might
torture otherwise contiguous districts. The first of these, which required
senatorial districts to be drawn in a way that was "convenient," appeared first
in Missouri (1820), before turning up in Arkansas (1836), New York (1846),
Wisconsin (1848), Minnesota (1857), Pennsylvania (1857), and Washington
(1889). 159 The convenience referred to was apparently the convenience of
voters and candidates in communicating with one another.' 6° The
requirement that districts be "compact" did not appear until 1848, in
Wisconsin, before spreading to West Virginia (1862), Missouri (1865),
6
Illinois (1870), Pennsylvania (1873), Colorado (1876), and other states.' '
A few state constitutions have contained provisions that are even more
specific and restrictive. Kentucky's 1850 constitution, for example, required
that cities and towns entitled to two or more representatives be "divided, by
squares which are contiguous, so as to make the most compact form.' 62 A
provision added to the Michigan constitution in 1963 requires senatorial
districts to be "as rectangular in shape as possible."'' 63 This trend culminated
in what is surely the most specific and demanding shape restriction of all, a
1974 Colorado provision requiring that "the agregate
linear distance of all
' 64
district boundaries shall be as short as possible."
158. WIs. CONST. of 1848, art. IV, § 4.
159. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 6; ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 31; N.Y.
CONST. of 1846, art. III, § 5; WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. IV, § 5; MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. IV,
§ 24; PA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 4 (1857) (limited to representative districts created by
subdivision of cities); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 6.
160. See supra note 47 and sources cited therein.
161. WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. IV, § 4; W. VA. CONST. of 1862, art. IV, § 4; Mo.
CONST. of 1865, art. IV, § 2; ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 6; PA. CONST. of 1873, art. H, § 17
(limited to representative districts created by subdivision of cities); COLO. CONST. of 1876, art.
V, § 47; see also MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. VI, § 3; N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. 2, § 29; N.Y.
CONST. art. III, § 4.
162. Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. II, § 5.
163. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 2. This provision did not impose some new and highly
burdensome compactness requirement; it merely reflected the requirement that districts follow
city and township lines, and the fact that, in Michigan, "[clities are, in general, made up of all
or parts of townships which are generally perfect squares." In re Apportionment of State
Legislature-1982, 321 N.W.2d 565, 580 (Mich. 1982) (per curiam).
164. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47(1).
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Chronologically the last anti-gerrymandering principle to make an initial
appearance in a state constitution is the one that is today considered
paramount in federal apportionment jurisprudence: the requirement of
population equality, which was not affirmatively required by any state
constitution until 1857.165 As indicated in Part lIJ.B above, state constitutions
provided early on for the allocation of legislators among represented units on
the basis of population. Before 1800, Massachusetts (1780), New Hampshire
(1784 and 1792), Vermont (1786 and 1793), Pennsylvania (1790), Kentucky
(1792 and 1799), and Tennessee (1796) all founded representation in at least
one branch of the legislature on population rather than territory. 166 Evidently,
however, state legislatures did not necessarily interpret the requirement of
representation by population to require population equality among districts,
but only to require representation proportional to such population as the
legislature saw fit to include in such districts it happened to draw. As a
result, many states eventually adopted additional, more specific provisions
expressly requiring that districts contain equal populations. The first such
provisions were adopted by Massachusetts in 1857, and required multilegislator counties to be subdivided into districts "equally, as nearly as may
167
be, according to the relative number of legal voters" in those districts.
Equal population requirements were soon thereafter adopted by West
Virginia (1862), Louisiana (1864), Maryland (1864), Missouri (1865),
Alabama (1867), and several other states. 168

165. MASS. CONST. amend. arts. XXI, XXII (1857). The requirement of interdistrict
population equality does, however, have a considerably older statutory history. The Northwest
Ordinance, enacted by Congress in 1787 to provide for the governance of non-state territories,
provided for the creation of territorial legislatures with members to be elected from counties
or townships in proportion to their population. Northwest Ordinance, § 9 (July 13, 1787),
reprintedin 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrUTION 27-28 (Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
166. Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. II, § 6; KY. CONST. of 1792, art. 1, § 6; MASS. CONST. of
1780, pt. II, ch. I, § III, art. II; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 9 (1784); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. IX
(1792); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4; TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. I, §§ 2, 3; VT. CONST. of
1793, ch. II, § 7; VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § VII.
167. MASS. CONST. amend. arts. XXI, XXII (1857).
168. See W. VA. CONST. of 1862, art. IV, §§ 4, 5; LA. CONST. of 1864, tit. III, art. 10;
MD. CONST. of 1864, art. III, § 2 (dividing Baltimore into "three several districts, of equal
population and contiguous territory"); Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. IV, § 2; ALA. CONST. of 1867,
art. VIII, § 3; see also N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 5; ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 6; PA.
CONST. of 1873, art. II, § 16; CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § l(b); N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. 2, § 29;
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4.
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F. Conclusions
What characteristics must an election district have in order to pass
constitutional muster? Why must a district be "contiguous" or "compact,"
and how do we know when these requirements are satisfied? We began this
examination of the historical evolution of state constitutional approaches to
apportionment in the hope of answering these questions by identifying some
specific motivating event or large-scale pattern that would illuminate the
meaning of the most common contemporary anti-gerrymandering provisions.
The results, unfortunately, have been meager.
It is clear enough that apportionment has been a constant and significant
concern in framing state governments; that changing circumstances have
sometimes required states to juggle a variety of competing considerations in
crafting apportionment rules; and that states have been willing to innovate, as
well as to borrow or adapt constitutional rules developed in other
jurisdictions. But it is equally clear that state constitutional drafters have,
since as early as 1790 and probably earlier, been well aware of the potential
for opportunistic, partisan manipulation of the rules of representation and
have slowly adjusted state constitutional apportionment rules to contain
various kinds of abuses. It is impossible, however, to identify a specific
historical incident or moment when this concern arose. State constitutional
provisions controlling gerrymandering and other forms of opportunistic
manipulation of representation have instead spread slowly and steadily from
one state constitution to another for more than two centuries, often in a way
that suggests they were adopted as a form of generalized advance precaution
rather than as a regulatory response to specific motivating abuses.
Gerrymandering, to be sure, was understood to be improper, but precisely
how-and compared to what-remains unclear.
If the provisions themselves do not yield any clear clues as to their
meaning, the next place to turn is to the judicial decisions authoritatively
construing them. The next Part takes up this inquiry.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ANTI-GERRYMANDERING PROVISIONS

It must be frankly acknowledged at the outset that a search of the case
law for guidance as to the meaning of state constitutional antigerrymandering provisions faces several significant obstacles. First,
notwithstanding the age of these provisions, their significance for the
structure of democratic self-governance, and the historical prevalence of
opportunistic manipulation of constitutional rules of representation, very few
state courts have a well-developed jurisprudence of apportionment.
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Seventeen states, in fact, have no state constitutional apportionment
jurisprudence at all-none. In these states not a single judicial decision
interprets any of the provisions that structure and regulate legislative
representation. 169 This is not to say that legal challenges have never been
filed to redistricting plans in these states; redistricting plans in these states,
particularly those in the South, have been the subject of frequent litigation,
but it has been litigation in federal court under the U.S. Constitution and the
Voting Rights Act rather than litigation in state court under provisions of the
state constitution.1 70 Another twenty-seven states have some minimal state
constitutional jurisprudence of apportionment.1 71 In these states, courts have
decided at least one case, and sometimes a few cases, interpreting some
apportionment provisions of the state constitution, but in general have not
squarely addressed the difficult problems posed by gerrymandering and other
forms of representation manipulation.
Only six states-Alaska, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, and
Vermont-have anything like a rich, well-developed state constitutional
jurisprudence of apportionment, with either numerous or especially wellreasoned decisions squarely construing the important state constitutional
provisions that structure legislative representation. Of these, Alaska's is by
far the most sophisticated and best-developed-not surprising given the way
in which Alaska's unusual ethnic diversity and oddly clumped population
169. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming.
170. For example, redistricting in Mississippi has taken place under the supervision of
federal courts for nearly forty years. A partial listing of such litigation includes cases, held
before three-judge panels, from every decennial redistricting cycle since the introduction of
the one-person, one-vote principle. See, e.g., Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 503 (S.D. Miss.
2002), aff'd sub nom. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003); Watkins v. Fordice, 791 F. Supp.
646 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Watkins v. Mabus, 771 F. Supp. 789 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (per curiam),
affd in part, 502 U.S. 954 (1991); Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988);
Jordan v. Winter, 604 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Miss.) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Miss.
Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984); Jordan v. Winter, 541 F.
Supp. 1135 (N.D. Miss. 1982) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. Brooks v. Winter, 461 U.S. 921
(1983); Connor v. Finch, 469 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Miss. 1979) (per curiam); Connor v. Finch,
419 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Miss. 1976) (per curiam), rev'd, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Connor v.
Johnson, 330 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Miss. 1971), vacated sub nom. Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S.
549 (1972) (per curiam); Connor v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 492 (S.D. Miss.), aff'd per curiam,
386 U.S. 483 (1967).
171. These states are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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centers, spread across an immense expanse of territory,
72 intensify all the
problems typically associated with territorial districting. 1
Second, in a pattern familiar to students of state constitutions, all of the
significant state decisions construing state constitutional anti-gerrymandering
provisions are relatively recent.1 73 The earliest state supreme court decision
invalidating a legislative district under an apportionment provision of any
state constitution was State ex rel. Attorney General v. Cunningham, an 1892
decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court striking down a state legislative
districting plan for creating severe population disparities among districts and
for carving up counties in violation of provisions of the Wisconsin
Constitution. 174 Even in the first half of the twentieth century, similar
decisions are sparse, and the vast bulk of the state constitutional
jurisprudence of apportionment did not arise until after 1962, when the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr175 opened the subject of
apportionment as a matter of federal jurisprudence.
This pattern has two consequences of relevance here. First, the entire
body of state constitutional provisions structuring state legislative
representation between 1776 and 1892-the period in which most of the
important evolution of these provisions occurred 17 6 -has been judicially
construed, if at all, long after the fact, and most of these provisions are
completely uninterpreted by any court. Second, because most state courts did
not begin to construe their own constitutions until after federal courts had
already begun to construe related provisions of the U.S. Constitution, state
courts often simply imported the terminology and conceptual templates of
172. As the Alaska Supreme Court has observed: "When Alaska's geographical,
climatical, ethnic, cultural and socio-economic differences are contemplated the task [of
redistricting] assumes Herculean proportions commensurate with Alaska's enormous land
area. The problems are multiplied by Alaska's sparse and widely scattered population and the
relative inaccessibility of portions of the state." Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856, 865 (Alaska
1972).
173. Much of the present level of activity in state constitutional law is attributable to
the federal rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, which prompted state judges to devote
renewed attention to their state constitutions, especially corresponding individual rights
provisions. For an account of this period, see JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 36-41 (2005).

174. 51 N.W. 724, 730 (Wis. 1892). In a second case decided six months later, the
court struck down a revised apportionment plan on the ground that it still contained excessive
population deviations. See State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35, 56 (Wis. 1892).
175. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
176. By Tarr's count, states adopted a total of ninety-four constitutions during the
nineteenth century, but only twenty-three constitutions during the twentieth century. TARR,
supra note 13, at 96, 137.
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federal constitutional law into the state constitutional jurisprudence when an
independent inquiry into the meaning of state constitutional provisions might
have been more illuminating,
thereby diminishing the utility and
177
persuasiveness of their analyses.
Finally, the most direct discussions by state courts of gerrymanderinglike similar discussions by federal courts-are simply not very helpful in
elucidating the precise ways in which gerrymandering violates constitutional
norms of representation, or indeed the content of the norms from which
gerrymandering is said to deviate. 78 By and large, state courts that have
directly addressed the practice of gerrymandering have tended to speak in
tautologies: gerrymandering is said, for example, to deviate from "true"
representation, 79 or "natural" and "logical" representation,180 or to produce

177. This is a common complaint in state constitutional law. See generally Hans A.
Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165 (1984); Hans
A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379
(1980); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of
Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REV.353 (1984).
178. As Professor Briffault has recently written, "[I]t is astonishing how little attention
the Supreme Court has given, in either Bandemer or Vieth, to the question of why partisan
gerrymandering might be unconstitutional." Richard Briffault, Defining the Constitutional
Question in Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 397, 399 (2005).
Similarly, Professor Lowenstein has argued, "The true source of confusion in interpreting
Bandemer is...an incomplete definition and explanation of the nature of the constitutional
violation that may inhere in a partisan gerrymander." Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Bandemer's
Gap: Gerrymandering and Equal Protection, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE
COURTS 64, 66 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1083-84 (2d ed. 1988); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy &
Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (criticizing the Court's failure, in both
Vieth and Bandemer to develop a coherent theory of the harm of gerrymandering). Similarly,
Adam B. Cox has recently argued for the incoherence of the Court's attempt to identify
representational harms caused by congressional gerrymandering while simultaneously
confining itself to the consideration, in isolation, of the redistricting plans of individual states.
See generally Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and DisaggregatedRedistricting,
2004 SUP. CT. REv. 409.
179. Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1992) ("'[T]he goal of all
apportionment plans is . . .adequate and true representation by the people in their elected
legislature, true, just, and fair representation."' (quoting and endorsing statement from the
1956 constitutional convention)); Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1975)
(compactness and contiguity requirements "'were found to be necessary to the preservation of
true representative government' (quoting Preisler v. Doherty, 284 S.W.2d 427, 435 (Mo.
1955))).
180. Hickel, 846 P.2d at 45 ("The constitutional requirements help to ensure that the
election district boundaries fall along natural or logical lines rather than political or other
lines.").
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results that are not "politically fair,"' 81 or to involve the "dilution" of
votes. 182 But what is "true" or "natural" or "logical" or "politically fair"
representation that does not "dilute" the value of votes? Gerrymandering
deviates from something-that is surely why it alarms us-but from what?
To answer these questions we need to know the theory of representation
from which state courts proceed when they adjudicate gerrymandering
claims under state constitutions. Given the difficulties presented by the
decisional law in this area, it is unreasonable to expect state courts to lay out
clearly their assumptions about what theory of representation their state
constitutions embrace. Consequently, I shall proceed indirectly, attempting to
infer a theory of representation from the various pronouncements and rulings
of state courts in interpreting and applying state constitutional provisions
aimed at controlling gerrymandering. The place to begin, then, is with a
different question, one that is related only indirectly to the problem of
gerrymandering: under state constitutions, what,
exactly, do state courts
183
think is being represented in the state legislature?
A. What Is Representedin State Legislatures under State Constitutions?
Ask a federal court what is represented in the halls of American
legislatures and you will get a crisp and immediate (though not necessarily
completely accurate) answer: people are represented in legislatures. As the
United States Supreme Court has directly, concisely, and unequivocally held,
"[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by
voters, not farms or cities or economic interests."'' 84 Perhaps unsurprisingly,
given the constitutional history of legislative representation related in Part
181.
People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 588 N.E.2d 1023, 1028 (Ill. 1991) ("The very
essence of districting is to produce a different-a more politically fair-result.") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 558 (Cal. 1992)
(redistricting plans that "follow the various state standards and criteria ... will necessarily
produce plans at least as 'fair,' politically or otherwise, as [other methods]" (quoting
Legislature v. Reinecke, 492 P.2d 385, 390 (Cal. 1972))); Opinion to the Governor, 221 A.2d
799, 802 (R.I. 1966) (gerrymandering may "nullifly]" "political equality").
182. Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1371 (Alaska 1987) (stating
that interest at stake in a challenge to gerrymandering is "the interest of individual members of
a geographic group or community in having their votes protected from disproportionate
dilution by the votes of another geographic group or community").
183.
Given the thinness of the decisional record, answers to these questions cannot be
definitive, and I shall content myself here with merely offering a hypothesis. It is a hypothesis,
however, that finds much to support it, and little to contradict it, in the admittedly meager
body of state constitutional law on point.
184. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
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III, state courts take a rather different, and certainly more nuanced view. In
the jurisprudence of apportionment arising under state constitutions,
representation of persons is by no means excluded as a constitutional
foundation of representation, but it is significantly demoted in the framework
that emerges from an examination of the state decisions.
State courts, to be sure, often acknowledge that legislative representation
is in part of persons, but this is most commonly viewed as a second-order
purpose, or even an incidental artifact of a representational structure aimed
fundamentally at achieving other goals. Thus, despite the fact that the
constitutions of thirty states explicitly require population equality for at least
some kinds of election districts, 85 maintaining strict population equality
among districts has been held to be the top priority in election district linedrawing by the courts of only four states-Colorado, Kentucky, New York,
and Washington 186 -and the constitutions of three of these states contain
unusual provisions explicitly elevating the importance of population
equality.187 In contrast, the highest courts of Alaska, Michigan, New Jersey,
and Utah have all held explicitly that maintaining population equality is not a
high priority under the state constitution, 188 and the supreme courts of
185. See supra note 43.
186. See In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 210 (Colo.
1982) (per curiam) ("The Colorado Constitution lists a hierarchy of criteria for measuring the
adequacy of a reapportionment plan .... [T]hey are: [(1)] the requirement of substantial
equality of population .. ");Jensen v. Ky. State Bd. of Elections, 959 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Ky.
1997) ("We have long held that when the goals of population equality and county integrity
inevitably collide, the requirement of approximate equality of population must control.");
People ex rel. Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors, 42 N.E. 592, 593 (N.Y. 1896) (identifying that
main purpose of New York Constitution of 1894 was "to prevent those gross discrepancies in
apportionment and representation that had long been a public scandal and a reproach to the
good name of the state"); State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers, 319 P.2d 828, 829 (Wash. 1957)
("[T]he basic concept of our representative form of state government... is ...that legislative
districts be established according to the number of inhabitants.").
187. The Colorado Constitution restricts the maximum population deviation among
legislative districts to five percent, see COLO. CONST. art. V, § 46, and the Kentucky
Constitution expressly provides that in drawing districts "the principle requiring every district
to be as nearly equal in population as may be shall not be violated," Ky. CONST. § 33. The
New York Constitution contains a provision, first introduced in 1894, that prohibits
population deviations between adjoining districts to exceed the population of any immediately
adjoining town or ward. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4.
188. See Wade v. Nolan, 414 P.2d 689, 692 (Alaska 1966) ("It is clear .. .that
representation in the Senate is determined by area rather than population."); In re
Apportionment of State Legislature-1982, 321 N.W.2d 565, 575 (Mich. 1982) (per curiam)
(state constitution "contemplated substantial population inequality between the districts");
Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 716-17 (N.J. 1964) ("[A]s to the Senate, it is perfectly

2006]

FOREWORD

Connecticut, Maryland, Missouri, and Wisconsin have ruled that population
equality, though not unimportant under the state constitution, is subordinate
in priority to other considerations.' 9
If population equality is not the predominant consideration in
apportionment under state constitutions-and in consequence representation
in the state legislature cannot be said to be mainly of persons-what is
represented there? Among the state courts to have addressed the question, the
most common answer is that the characteristics principally represented in
state legislatures under state constitutional rules of representation are (1)
territory and (2) interests.
Given the relentless emphasis in state constitutions on counties as the
unit of representation, it seems only logical for courts to recognize
geographical territory as a leading, or even the dominant, basis of legislative
representation. As the Alaska Supreme Court, for example, has
acknowledged, "representation in the [state] Senate is determined by area
rather than population."' 90 The Utah Supreme Court has similarly held that
the allocation of representatives by county regardless of population reveals
the state constitution's "approval [of] the idea of area representation."' 191 As
plain that the apportionment basis is indifferent to population."); Parkinson v. Watson, 291
P.2d 400, 404 (Utah 1955) (Utah's constitution, like that of most western states, "indicates
that equality of representation is not the general rule"). Following consideration of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds, which effectively invalidated the New Jersey
Constitution's apportionment scheme, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that under the
remaining valid provisions "recognition of county lines will not justify any deviation" from
population equality, but also ruled that municipal boundaries should nevertheless be respected
when possible. Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 291 A.2d 134, 142 (N.J. 1972).
189. See Cahill v. Leopold, 103 A.2d 818, 824 (Conn. 1954) ("In view of the
provisions that each county shall have at least one senator, that no district shall cross county
lines and that no town shall be divided ...equality is impossible."); Md. Comm. for Fair
Representation v. Tawes, 180 A.2d 656, 667 (Md. 1962) ("We do not think it possible (or
advisable if it were possible) to state a precise, inflexible and intractable formula for
constitutional representation in the General Assembly. . . . In Maryland, there is no
requirement, constitutional or otherwise, that such representation be based upon a
mathematical ratio of population, or of eligible voters .... ");State ex rel. Barrett v.
Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40, 55 (Mo. 1912) ("[A]ny departure from the limitation of equality in
population must be made for the sake of securing greater compactness .... ); State ex rel.
Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35, 57 (Wis. 1892) (determining that only compliance with
contiguity, compactness, boundary preservation, and other state constitutional requirements
can excuse departures from population equality).
190. Wade, 414 P.2d at 692.
191. Parkinson,291 P.2d at 405; see also State ex rel. Fletcher v. Ruhe, 52 P. 274, 277
(Nev. 1898) ("[I]t is impracticable to apportion representation by any other method than by
geographical lines.").
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recently as 1962, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that "representation in
the State Senate of Maryland has traditionally been based more upon area
and geographical location (one from each county and each legislative district
of Baltimore City) than upon the relationship of population, or eligible
voters[,]' 192 although it subsequently endorsed-without necessarily
rejecting its prior view-the proposition that legislatures "represent
people." 193 It has even been argued that the people of New Jersey historically
did not comprise a meaningful political community, and that the state's
counties had distinct sectional interests that the state constitution was
deliberately designed to represent:
"It would be misleading to depict the Jerseys as one general community. In
fact, there were sharp contrasts between East and West Jersey, contrasts
which have not disappeared even today. . . ." [The state constitution's]
balancing of legislative power between the two divisions . .. [reflected the
fact that they were] composed of peoples with differing economic interests,
religious affiliations and national origins. Thus was established the precedent
for legislative representation based upon territory as distinguished from
population. This colonially-instituted mode of apportionment has been
perpetuated in the equal representation of counties in one house of the
legislature under our State Constitutions of 1776, 1844 and 1947.194
Even state courts that have construed their constitutions to recognize
population as a factor of at least some significance in apportionment
typically recognize that the question of what is represented in the legislature
is one of much greater complexity than federal courts generally
acknowledge. The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, has construed its
state constitution to institute a formula for representation based on land and
population, in which both must be weighed. 95 The New Jersey Supreme
Court recognized that population plays a role in redistricting because the
192. Tawes, 180 A.2d at 668.
193. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 649, 657 (Md. 1993) (implicitly
endorsing statements to this effect of chairman of redistricting advisory commission and
special master).
194. Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 729 (N.J. 1964) (Haneman, J., concurring)
(quoting RICHARD P. MCCORMICK, NEW JERSEY FROM COLONY TO STATE 56-57 (1964)).
195. See In re Apportionment of State Legislature-1982, 321 N.W.2d 565, 567, 575
(Mich. 1982) (per curiam). This dual relationship was especially pronounced in the Michigan
Constitution of 1963, which created a complex apportionment formula based explicitly on
area and population. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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process "apportion[s] the power to elect among clusters of citizens," but
went on to observe that "[tihose clusters . . . are constituted solely on the
basis of geography."'' 96 A decision like that of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
holding that "[t]he constitution contains no consciously built-in standard of
apportionment that reflects area or any other geographical factor" 197 is as
exceedingly rare in the body of state constitutional apportionment
jurisprudence as it is common in decisions of federal courts construing the
Equal Protection Clause.
The other basis of representation in state legislatures most commonly
mentioned by state courts is interest. Thus, in Utah the state constitution's
provisions structuring representation are understood to grapple with the
''question as to how urban-rural interests could be properly balanced and
protected." 98 As one Wisconsin Supreme Court justice put it in a nineteenthcentury case: "The city has its peculiar interests, and the country has its
interests, and they generally conflict."' 199 In New Jersey, the representation of
counties has been held to effectuate a kind of interest representation on the
ground that "the counties reflect different economic interests.,, 2°° According
to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Virginia's regions are
distinguished by the interests of their inhabitants: in the north, "the interests
of its people are primarily centered in Washington[,]"
while further south the
20
"interests of its people are largely agricultural. '
This view of the matter certainly lacks the clarity of the U.S. Supreme
Court's univocal emphasis on the legislative representation of individuals,
and one might therefore at this point be tempted to ask, on what conceivable
account of representation can it possibly be said that geographic areas and
interests and, to a lesser degree, persons are all represented simultaneously in
a legislature? The answer implicit in the cases is surprisingly clear. Among
state courts that have considered the question, territory and interest-the
interest, that is, of persons residing in the territory-typically are thought to
coincide. People who live in the same place, in other words, are thought to
have similar interests-interests that arise from common residency and that
196. Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 291 A.2d 134, 138 (N.J. 1972).
197. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Zimmerman, 126 N.W.2d 551, 558 (Wis. 1964).
198. Parkinson v. Watson, 291 P.2d 400, 405 (Utah 1955).
199. State ex rel. Lamb v. Cunningham, 53 N.W. 35, 63 (Wis. 1892) (Winslow, J.,
dissenting).
200. Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (N.J. 1964); see also In re
Reapportionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 671 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting) ("Each of the political subdivisions sought to be protected by Article II, § 16 of the
state constitution has unique interests .... ).
201. Wilkins v. Davis, 139 S.E.2d 849, 853 (Va. 1965).
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are sufficiently similar to justify representing them in the legislature by
territorial groupings. This idea is, in fact, a venerable one in the AngloAmerican history of legislative representation, dating back to medieval
times, yet in state constitutional law it is given a surprisingly modem and
coherent defense.
B. TerritorialRepresentationas Interest Representation
The roots of Anglo-American political representation lie in the
representation of communities, not individuals. 2 2 Originally, representation
in Parliament was a metaphorical representation of the land itself.
Landholding in feudal England carried with it certain obligations, among
them the duty to provide various forms of aid to the crown, including, upon
request, financial assistance.20 3 Because, by tradition and under the Magna
Carta, financial impositions could not be assessed without the consent of
those tenured in the lord's land, representatives of the land were summoned
to parliament for the purpose of giving their consent to taxation. 2°
By the early fourteenth century, the rise of wealth derived from sources
other than land created new potential sources of royal revenue, and
representation in parliament was accordingly expanded to include
representatives from corporate towns and boroughs. Although town
representatives may have been understood to represent roughly the interests
of non-geographic mercantile classes,20 5 they were nevertheless selected, in
keeping with the universal practice, from "geographically defined
communities." 2°6 In England, "political geography was deemed to determine
something essential, 20 7 and as a result, representation was based on the unit
from which consent was required, irrespective of its actual characteristics,
including who or how many happened to live there, or even the amount of
202. The next several paragraphs draw freely on James A. Gardner, One Person, One
Vote and the Possibilityof PoliticalCommunity, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1243-45 (2002).
203.

M.V. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT 253 (1964).

204.

2 WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN ITS ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT 199-201 (1880); G.L. Harriss, The Formation of Parliament,1272-1377,
in THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 29, 41 (R.G. Davies & J.H. Denton eds.,

1981).
205.
206.

2 STUBBS, supra note 204, at 210.

EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 41 (1988).

207.

PEOPLE:

THE

RISE

OF

POPULAR

CLARKE, supra note 203, at 285; see also ANDREW REHFELD, THE CONCEPT OF

CONSTITUENCY: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL

DESIGN 72 (2005) ("Territory was a seemingly 'natural' part of representation ... ").
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revenue due from the taxable unit. 20 8 Thus, by the late fourteenth century,
representatives in parliament consisted of two knights from each county and
two citizens or burgesses from each city or borough within the represented
counties, regardless of population, wealth, or property value. 1°
This model was duly exported to America, where representation in
colonial legislatures was allocated, as we have seen, not to individuals but to
towns and counties. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court said in
1811, "[t]he right of sending representatives [to the state legislature] is
corporate, vested in the town., 210 By the time this method of representation
became entrenched in the colonies, however, its justification had evolved
from one based on feudal obligations in land to one based on the common
characteristics of the inhabitants of represented units:
The corporate method of representation presumed that physical proximity
generated communal sentiment. Each geographic unit was thought to be an
organic, cohesive community, whose residents knew one another, held
common values, and shared compatible economic interests. The smaller the
community, the more likely that its citizens would identify with one another.
.. . Large distances, in contrast, bred a diversity of peoples and values.
Although actual settlements were never as unified in practice as in theory,
the idea contained some truth. Sharing a common history and future
211
reinforced the sense of communal identity among inhabitants.
By the time of the Revolution, the founding generation fully accepted
this account of representation. The idea that the political interests of
communal groups of individuals correlated strongly with territory served, for
example, as an axiom in Madison's famous defense of the large republic in
The FederalistNo. 10. "[F]actious combinations," Madison argued, are "less
208.

For a thorough discussion of medieval taxation policies, see G.L. HARRISS, KING,
1369 (1975).
209. See A.L. Brown, Parliament,c. 1377-1422, in THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT INTHE
MIDDLE AGES, supra note 204, at 109, 117-18.
210. In re Opinion of Justices, 7 Mass. (6 Tyng) 523, 526 (1811). In 1857, an
amendment to the state constitution changed the method of allocating representatives among
the towns from an uncapped constitutional entitlement based roughly on taxpaying population
to one in which a fixed number of representatives was apportioned by the legislature on the
basis of population. MASS. CONST. amend, art. XXI (1857). This change, in the court's view,
destroyed the former system of corporately vested representation rights. See Stone v. City of
Charlestown, 114 Mass. 214, 226 (1873).
211.
ZAGARRI, supra note 28, at 37-38 (footnote omitted); see also REHFELD, supra
note 207, at 73-77.
PARLIAMENT, AND PUBLIC FINANCE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND TO
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to be dreaded" in a large republic than in a small one because of the greater
variety of interests found among a larger populace, a characteristic that is
entirely an artifact of geographical scale: "Extend the sphere and you take in
a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens ....
,,212
The idea that territorially defined local communities may reliably serve
as proxies for the shared, collective interests of the individuals who inhabit
them has remained a fixture in American political thought ever since. 213 So,
for example, a Cattaraugus County delegate to the New York constitutional
convention of 1846 complained about the large size of the senatorial district
to which his county was assigned, which stretched nearly 230 miles to
Chenango County, on the ground that
for all practical purposes of representation, Cattaraugus might as well have
been connected with Suffolk and the counties on Long Island [more than
twice as far away]. There was no communion of feeling between the people
of Cattaraugus and Chenango. There was no union of interest between them
except upon those great questions that affect and interest the state as a whole.
The people of these counties on questions214of a local character, often the most
deeply felt, were antipodes of each other.
Among delegates to the Wisconsin constitutional convention of 1851, "[t]he
leading idea seems to have been that each county was regarded in the nature
of 'a small republic,' or 'in the light of a family,' and 'each organized county
had a separate interest."' 2 5 More than a century later, precisely the same idea
was expressed by a Pennsylvania state senator testifying before the U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee in favor of a constitutional amendment that
would have overturned Reynolds v. Sims by permitting representation in state
senates to remain on the basis of counties rather than population:
103, at 83.

212.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note

213.

For a strong critique of this phenomenon, see THOMAS BENDER, COMMUNITY AND

SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA 4-8 (1978).
214. SHERMAN CROSWELL & R. SUTTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEWYORK STATE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION 316 (1846).

215. State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Cunningham, 51 N.W. 724, 739 (Wis. 1892)
(Pinney, J.,
concurring) (quoting JOURNAL OF DEBATES 219-24 (1851)); see also 2 REPORT OF
THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1244 (1850) (remarks of Mr. Dobson) ("[E]ach average county
having a separate interest, ought to have a separate representation in the Legislature.").
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Carbon County is in the heart of the anthracite coal fields. Pike and Wayne
Counties are in the heart of the Pocono resort area. Susquehanna, Wyoming,
and Sullivan are up in the north woods. So you have three distinct groups of
people with three distinctly different interests all represented
by one senator
216
[when senatorial districts are based on population].

In its more modern incarnation, the belief that place and interest coincide
centers on the idea of a "community of interest." This term is widely used in
federal reapportionment jurisprudence, but it is usually used there so broadly
and indiscriminately as to include virtually any group of people who share
some trait or characteristic that has the potential to be salient politically211

218

their socioeconomic status,2 17 for example, or their education,
employment, 219 politics, 220 health, 221 religion, 222 or ethnicity 223-and which
216.

United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings before the

Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), at 208 (statement
of Hon. E. Elmer Hawbaker).
217. Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1997) (affirming the lower
court's finding that a "predominantly urban, low-income population" could constitute a
community of interest); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919 (1995) (evidence of "fractured
... social, and economic interests" refuted contention that district contained a community of
interest); see also Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 513 (5th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that
satisfactory evidence of socio-economic status could demonstrate the existence of a
community of interest, but finding that the plaintiffs did not provide it); Session v. Perry, 298
F. Supp. 2d 451, 512 (E.D. Tex.) (three-judge panel) (finding "evidence of differences in
socio-economic status" was properly, though not persuasively, deployed to undermine the
existence of a community of interest), vacated and remanded sub nom. Henderson v. Perry,
543 U.S. 941 (2004).
218. Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 486 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
"less-educated" citizens comprised a community of interest on the basis of "common social
and economic needs"); Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (finding "evidence of differences in
...education" was properly, though not persuasively, deployed to undermine the existence of
a community of interest).
219. Theriot, 185 F.3d at 486 (citizens "more often unemployed" than voters in other
districts comprised a community of interest on the basis of "common social and economic
needs"); Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (finding "evidence of differences in ... employment"
relevant to existence of a community of interest).
220. Miller, 515 U.S. at 919 (evidence of "fractured political ... interests" refuted
contention that district contained a community of interest).
221.
Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (finding "evidence of differences in ... health"
relevant to existence of a community of interest).
222. See, e.g., Kelley v. Bennett, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (M.D. Ala.) (three-judge panel)
("There are no doubt religious, class, and social communities of interest that cross county
lines and whose protection might be a legitimate consideration in districting decisions."),
vacatedon othergrounds sub nom. Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28 (2000) (per curiam).
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may therefore provide a justification for grouping them together in a single
election district. On this understanding, however, the existence of a
community of interest is not linked in any particular way to a specific piece
of territory or geographically defined local governmental unit; the federal
conception of community of interest, that is to say, does not contemplate the
inevitable development of a community of interest with particular
characteristics in a particular location.22 4 The poor, for example, may on this
view constitute a community of interest, but the poor may live here or there,
and a district could be drawn around them in any place they happen to be
found in sufficient numbers. What therefore justifies grouping the poor in a
territorial election district is their poverty, and presumably the shared
political interests to which their poverty gives rise, not their common
habitation of a specific place. On this view, then, the existence of a
community of interest is anything but inevitable: the idea is not that residents
of a piece of territory share a connection to it, and that this shared connection
in due course gives rise to a community of interest, but that certain people
who, for reasons unrelated to residency, happen to share a politically salient

223. See, e.g., Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (assuming
that Latinos comprise a community of interest); Meza v. Galvin, 322 F. Supp. 2d 52, 75 (D.
Mass. 2004) (three-judge panel) ("the Hispanic community" can comprise "an
ethnically-based community of interest"). However, the Supreme Court has been quite careful
and emphatic in holding that race does not by itself give rise to a constitutionally cognizable
community of interest; in the Court's view, the only way to connect race and interest is to
make demeaning and stereotypical, and therefore constitutionally forbidden, judgments about
the homogeneity of political views among members of racial groups. See Miller, 515 U.S. at
920. In view of this holding, it is not entirely clear that the Court would approve the use of
ethnicity, without more, as the basis for a community of interest deserving of protection in
redistricting, as other lower courts seem to have recognized. See, e.g., Session, 298 F. Supp.
2d at 513 (applying Miller in a way that would require a non-ethnic basis for district
communities of interest).
224. The conceptual breadth of the idea of a community of interest, and its lack of a
necessary relation to a particular place, may be undermined to some degree by the actual
practice of redistricting, in which the availability of data, and its relation to existing
geographical understandings of the state, may significantly constrain the willingness of the
state to recognize certain kinds of communities of interest and to provide them with
representation. See Benjamin Forest, Information Sovereignty and GIS: The Evolution of
"Communities of Interest" in PoliticalRedistricting, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 425, 428 (2004)
(arguing that the practice of Texas redistricters in the 1990s of relying on existing data to
identify communities of interest "reproduced and reinforced a relatively narrow concept of a
'community of interest,' one limited to spatially defined, territorially bounded communities
about which the state already possessed a great deal of systematized information").
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also happen, adventitiously, to live in close physical
characteristic
22
proximity. 1
In the apportionment jurisprudence of the states, however, the concept of
community of interest is very different, retaining much of its older
connotation of a strong and inevitable linkage between a place and the
people who collectively inhabit it. The dominant notion in state
constitutional jurisprudence is in fact quite specific and robust: the
inhabitants of a county or town most commonly are presumed to comprise a
community of interest, thereby justifying the constitutional designation of
local governments-rather than geographically untethered, equipopulous
groupings of individuals-as the fundamental units of legislative
representation. 226
Why should we think that the inhabitants of a county comprise a
community of interest? What is it about common habitation of a unit of local
government that creates a community of interest among the residents? State
courts generally give two distinct, though not unrelated answers to this
question. First, the inhabitants of a county or similar local government unit
share a common local economy and economic life. Second, county residents
participate together in the public life of a shared unit of political and
governmental administration. I take up each of these propositions in turn.
C. Territory and Interest (I): County Economies
The linkage in state constitutional apportionment jurisprudence between
counties as the basic constitutional unit of representation and the shared
225. As Benjamin Forest has observed in contemplating a similar tension in the federal
jurisprudence of racial redistricting, "the 'placelessness' of numeric representation challenges
some of the basic tenets of the American system of governance. Its reliance on the
autonomous individual severs any necessary connection between identity and location, and
fatally undermines the theoretical justification for territorial representation itself." Benjamin
Forest, Mapping Democracy: Racial Identity and the Quandary of PoliticalRepresentation,
91 ANNALS ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 143, 160 (2001).
226. This conception has very deep roots. In colonial Massachusetts, for example,
collective harmony and consensus were considered such vital and indispensable conditions for
communal life that it was widely assumed that the formal extent of a governing unit had to
correspond closely to the extent of the community in which harmony and consensus could
antecedently be found: "So long as the maintenance of an effective community required
widespread consent of the governed, the unit of government had to be one in which such
When harmony and homogeneity were broken,
united public opinion could be obtained ....
the territorial integrity of the town itself often had to be ruptured accordingly." MICHAEL
ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS: NEW ENGLAND TOWNS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

138-39 (1970).
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economic life of county residents has never been expressed more clearly than
in a 1964 opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Anciently, and still today, the counties reflect different economic interests,
although of course these economic interests are not perfectly contained or
separated by any political line, municipal, county or State. So, certain
counties have a dominant concern with manufacturing and commerce; others
have a large stake in agriculture; still others lean heavily upon the resort
industry; and finally a few counties have a special interest in the products of
the sea.227
The idea here, clearly, is that counties are not arbitrary territorial units,
random shapes on a map, to be ignored or rearranged on a whim, but rather
contain populations that have distinctive interests, and these interests are
primarily economic; each county, that is to say, comprises a distinct local
economy. The correspondence between counties and local economies is not,
of course, exact-there is some cross-border slippage-but it is close enough
so that, if the constitutional system of legislative representation is meant to
secure representation for the distinctive local economic interests of the
state's citizens, then allocating legislative representation to counties rather
than other groupings is amply justified.
The kind of direct language employed by the New Jersey Supreme Court
is nowadays rare, however, due mainly to the influence of the U.S. Supreme
Court's one-person, one-vote decisions. By forcefully denying that local
government units have any intrinsic claim to separate representation in state
legislatures-never really the actual claim-the Court delegitimized state
representational systems that protected the integrity of local governments in
227. Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (N.J. 1964); see also In re
Reapportionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 671 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting) ("Each of the political subdivisions sought to be protected by Article II, § 16 of the
state constitution has unique interests .... "). In Wilkins v. Davis, the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals reached a similar conclusion about multi-county districts:
The evidence shows a greater community of interest among the people of the Tenth
District, which is a part of metropolitan Washington, than between the people of that
district and those of the adjoining Eighth. The Tenth District is the second smallest in
area of the ten districts, containing only 446 square miles, and the interests of its
people are primarily centered in Washington. The only district contiguous to the
Tenth is the Eighth, which is the second largest district in area, covering 7,170 square
miles, containing twenty counties and two cities, and the interests of its people are
largely agricultural.
139 S.E.2d 849, 853 (Va. 1965).
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the crafting of legislative election districts. After Reynolds, a state still "may
legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political
subdivisions," but to do so the state must demonstrate that "[v]alid
considerations ...underlie such [an] aim[]."228
This requirement has prompted state courts to speak of county
representation using a language that refers to its underlying justifications,
and the terminology of choice has been the lainguage of "communities of
interest." Consequently, since Reynolds, state courts have tended to justify
state constitutional provisions making counties (or towns, in New England)
the fundamental units of legislative representation on the ground that
counties circumscribe communities of interest, and that it is these
communities of interest, rather than the counties containing them, that are
entitled legitimately to representation. This change in terminology did not,
however, alter the basic account that state courts give of counties. They are
still understood as distinct local economies, but the account now contains an
extra term: county-based local economies give rise to a community of
interest, the community of interest coincides roughly with the county, and,
therefore, county229boundaries should be respected in drawing legislative
election districts.
228. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964).
229. I must here offer a proviso: there is a split of opinion among state courts, though
overall a relatively minor one, concerning whether the preservation of communities of interest
is even an important consideration in reapportionment. The constitutions of five statesAlaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, and Oklahoma-specifically require that some
consideration be given to communities of interest in the reapportionment process, see supra
notes 48-52 and accompanying text, and the preservation of communities of interest has been
endorsed as a reasonably important, or at least valid, consideration by the highest courts of
California, Maine, and Vermont. See Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 556 (Cal. 1992) (approving
districting plan of special masters in part on ground that their refusal to divide census tracts
contributed to preservation of communities of interest); In re 2003 Legislative Apportionment
of House of Representatives, 827 A.2d 810, 814-15 (Me. 2003) (implicitly approving a state
statute directing redistricting commission to give weight to local communities of interest in
drawing districts); In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624
A.2d 323, 330 (Vt. 1993) (strongly endorsing importance of preservation of communities of
interest). On the other hand, preserving communities of interest has been specifically held not
to be a constitutionally important consideration by the highest courts of Florida, Iowa,
Maryland, New Jersey, Virginia and-remarkably, given the apparently clear language of the
state constitution-Hawaii. See In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 1987, 817
So. 2d 819, 831 (Fla.2002) ("[N]either the United States nor the Florida Constitution requires
that the Florida Legislature . . . preserve communities of interest."); In re Legislative
Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Iowa 1972) (agreeing that "avoiding
joining part of a rural county with an urban county" was one of several "unjustifiable
purposes" that required invalidation of plan); In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d
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As a result, although state courts adjudicating apportionment schemes
now speak the language of communities of interest, an open-ended term that
could conceivably describe communities arising from almost any kind of
shared interest, in case after case, the critical indicator in the state cases that
an election district contains a constitutionally cognizable community of
interest turns out to be the presence of significant economic interaction
among the people of the district. For example, in invalidating a Vermont
representative district that placed the town of Montgomery in a district
292, 297, 298 (Md. 2002) (framers of state constitution deliberately chose not to make
preservation of communities of interest a factor in apportionment, nor may the court "define
what a community of interest is and where its boundaries are"); Jackman v. Bodine, 231 A.2d
193, 200 (N.J. 1967) (following Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote decisions, state
constitution must be construed to mean that "matters . . . such as so-called community
interests" "are wholly irrelevant to the subject and cannot support [population] deviations of
any kind"); Jamerson v. Womack, 423 S.E.2d 180, 184 (Va. 1992) ("[T]he reapportionment
polic[y] ... of recognizing communities of interest [is] a custom [that] was not.., spelled out
in the Constitution."); see also Kawamoto v. Okata, 868 P.2d 1183, 1187 (Haw. 1994)
(complaining about the vagueness of the boundaries of informally defined communities, and
arguing that "[t]he lack of defined boundaries precludes reapportionment based upon a strict
recognition of community interests").
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in particular, has been overtly hostile to the concept of
communities of interest, complaining that the idea is "nebulous and unworkable," and that
"the number of such communities is virtually unlimited and no reasonable standard could
possibly be devised to afford them recognition in the formulation of districts." In re
Legislative Districting of State, 475 A.2d 428, 445 (Md. 1984). More recently, the Maryland
high court seems to have softened its views somewhat, moving closer to the position taken by
the Virginia Supreme Court to the effect that legislative recognition of communities of
interest, although not constitutionally recognized as an important consideration in
reapportionment, is nevertheless not improper so long as the districting plan otherwise
complies with all relevant constitutional requirements. In re Legislative Districting of State,
805 A.2d at 297 (permitting the Governor and General Assembly to consider "countless other
factors" beyond constitutionally required ones, so long as they comply with constitutional
minima); Jamerson, 423 S.E.2d at 184 (preserving communities of interest, although not
constitutionally required, is nevertheless a "custom" and "one of several factors to be
considered in reapportionment cases"). The courts of the remaining states have not directly
addressed the question as a matter of state constitutional law, but nothing in their
jurisprudence suggests that they in any way discourage respect for communities of interest,
even though they may not affirmatively encourage it.
As a result, the ensuing analysis rests primarily on the apportionment jurisprudence of a
comparatively small number of states (Alaska, Colorado, New Jersey (pre-1966), Vermont,
and Virginia) in which (1) the preservation of communities of interest is thought to be an
important or legitimate consideration for the redistricting authority to take into account in
crafting legislative apportionment plans, and (2) the state's highest court has said so directly.
Though this limitation necessarily makes the analysis suggestive rather than conclusive, the
evidence is nonetheless sufficiently clear, consistent, and rich to justify careful attention.
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located mainly to its east, the Vermont Supreme Court found it significant
that "trade and commerce generally moves westward from Montgomery, ...
and except for a few Montgomery residents who work at the Jay Peak ski
area, the work force moves in a westerly direction., 230 Courts frequently look
to common participation in local markets as evidence of the kind of
interaction that gives rise to a community of interest for purposes of
apportionment. Thus, in Colorado the presence within a district of "'a
common employment base"' provides evidence of a community of
interest;231 in Alaska, shared patronage of "professionals and financial
institutions serv[ing] the needs of ... major industrial activities" furnishes
similar evidence.232 In Vermont, common reliance on "large commercial
areas" and participation in medical service markets, along with reciprocal
commuting patterns, all count233as evidence of a community of interest among
residents of proximate areas.
In some states, the existence of a dominant local industry also counts as
evidence of a community of interest entitled to legislative representation. In
New Jersey and Virginia, the dominant industry is generally defined
,3
broadly-"manufacturing, ' 1,234 or "agriculture, 235
for instance. In Alaska, a
dominant industry capable of constituting a community of interest is often
defined with greater particularity: "fishing, fish processing, forest products,
and tourism" are such industries,2 36 as is "the timber industry. 2 37 Even a
local dependence on "the operation of state government" 238-an industry of
public employment, as it were-provides evidence of a constitutionally
sufficient community of interest.

230. In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
at 331.
231. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 195 (Colo. 1982)
(per curiam) (quoting report of state redistricting commission).
232. Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1362 (Alaska 1987); accord
Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1992).
233. In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
at 340.
234. Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (N.J. 1964).
235. Id.; Wilkins v. Davis, 139 S.E.2d 849, 853 (Va. 1965) ("[Tlhe interests of its
people are largely agricultural.").
236. Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 879 (Alaska 1974) (quoting Advisory Board's
findings).
237. Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1215 (Alaska 1983).
238. Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Alaska 1987)
(describing the economy of Juneau).
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A shared dependence on a common urban center likewise is viewed as
evidence of a cognizable community of interest, 239 and a districting plan that
"separates the downtowns of two major cities from the rest of the cities," or
even "splits two closely interrelated cities" 24° may therefore fail to observe
communities of interest coinciding with metropolitan areas. Shared reliance
on public services, such as "state offices . . . [or a] regional hospital and
airport," 24 1 has also been mentioned as evidence of a community of interest.
"Transportation," the U.S. Supreme Court has held, "is essential to
commerce, ' 242 and it is therefore no surprise to find that courts searching for
a community of interest within a challenged election district have often
thought it important to consider whether the various parts of the district are
well connected by transportation links. Thus, the presence within a district of
"a network of roads connecting the [parts of the district], 243 or a welldeveloped highway system such as "'the U.S. 50 transportation corridor' 244
furnishes evidence of a community of interest, as do "daily scheduled air
flights and frequent ferry service." 245 Even a "highway connection" that has
only been "planned" but not yet built has been deemed relevant.2 4 6 Similarly,
among the factors that state courts have found to impede the formation or
maintenance of a community of interest are various physical barriers to
regular and convenient transportation among parts of a district, including the
presence of a river" or a mountain range, 248 and the lack of good quality
roads connecting parts of the district. 249
239. Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 50-51 (Alaska 1992); Wilkins, 139 S.E.2d
at 853; see also Groh, 526 P.2d at 879 ("[H]istorically the three communities have always
been closely linked, with Juneau serving as an economic hub for Haines and Skagway.").
240. Hickel, 846 P.2d at 50-51.
241. In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
323, 340 (Vt. 1993).
242. Reading R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 281 (1872).
243. In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
at 340.
244. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 195 (Colo. 1982)
(quoting Colorado Reapportionment Commission's conclusion).
245. Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 879 (Alaska 1974).

246.

Id.

247. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 209, 212 (Colo. 1982)
(per curiam) (Platte River).
248. In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
at 331 (Green Mountains).
249. Id. ("Although there are two roads that run east from Montgomery over the spine,
one is a seasonal road and the other is difficult to travel in the winter."); id. at 342 (noting that
the only connection between two towns in another proposed district was a "graded gravel
road, which is passable only six months of the year"); see also In re Reapportionment of Colo.
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Finally, in enumerating the kinds of shared concerns and interests among
a district population that, if found, would provide evidence of a community
of interest, state courts have tended to focus heavily on the economic. These
include a common interest in "growth issues,"25 ° the local "tax rate, 251 the
"development of [a] ski area ' 252 or "a common port facility, '253 "fisheries
development, fish processing quality and safety, and forest management, 2 4
as well as "a common interest in the management and disposition of state
lands. 2 55
This is not to say that courts never consider social factors in deciding
whether an election district contains a community of interest. Historical
connections between areas; 256 cultural commonalities, 57 including shared
participation in local entertainment and media markets;2 58 housing
patterns;2 59 and patterns of social interactions among district inhabitants 26° all
come up from time to time. Even recreational patterns are sometimes taken
into account; in one case, a state high court thought it significant that two
Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 195 (Colo. 1992) ("[T]here is no improved road directly
connecting principal population centers in Gunnison County to Pitkin County, and the only
access from Aspen to the eastern slope counties is across Independence Pass, which ... is
closed for about six months each year." (footnote omitted)).
250. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1251 (Colo.
2002).
251. In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
at 340; see also id. at 343 (issues of "disproportionate tax burdens").
252. Id. at 343.
253. Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 877 (Alaska 1974) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1215 (Alaska 1983) ("port
development").
254. Carpenter,667 P.2d at 1215.
255. Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1361 (Alaska 1987).
256. Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1992) ("historical links").
257. Id. at 53-54 (discussing the lack of social and economic integration between the
Inupiaq and Athabaskan cultures).
258. Hickel, 846 P.2d at 47 (sharing dependence on urban center for "entertainment"
and "news"); Kenai PeninsulaBorough, 743 P.2d at 1363 (finding social link when residents
"share the same news and entertainment media"). Shared participation in a common media
market is one of the few factors recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court to evidence a
community of interest. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996) (one "manifestation[] of
community of interest" is "shared broadcast and print media").
259. Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 879 (Alaska 1974).
260. Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1215 n.25 (Alaska 1983) ("occasional
social gatherings" and "some intervisitation . . . via air mail and ferry transport"); Kenai
PeninsulaBorough, 743 P.2d at 1363 ("residents of the area ... visit each other frequently");
In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323, 331 (Vt.
1993) ("social interaction").
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towns in a proposed district shared "bowling tournaments [and]
interscholastic sports competition. 26 1
Nevertheless, it is clear that these kinds of social factors take a back seat
to economic ones in determining the existence of a community of interest.
Even in Alaska, where the state constitution specifically requires
preservation of "socio-economic area[s]" in apportionment,262 the "socio"
gets short shrift compared to the "economic." Relying on statements made at
the 1956 constitutional convention, the Alaska Supreme Court has construed
"socio-economic area" to mean a place "where people live together and work
together and earn their living together," an "economic unit inhabited by
people," and "a group of people living within a geographical unit ...
following, if possible, similar economic pursuits. 263 Conversely, the social
factors that tend to dominate the community-of-interest inquiry on the
federal level-especially race and ethnicity--come up only very rarely in
state apportionment jurisprudence, 264 and play a distinctly minor role in the
analysis compared to economic considerations. Of course, one needs to be
somewhat cautious in drawing inferences about the lack of attention to race
and ethnicity in state apportionment jurisprudence given the federal
dominance of the subject under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting
Rights Act. But even so, the states' judicial record of dealing with
apportionment criteria is weighted strikingly in favor of the economic over
the social.265
261.
Carpenter,667 P.2d at 1215 n.25.
262. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6.
263. Groh, 526 P.2d at 878.
264. See, e.g., id. (alluding to "patterns of... minority residency"); Wilson v. Eu, 823
P.2d 545, 556 (Cal. 1992) (referring approvingly to special masters' attempt to draw a plan
that "assure[s] full participation by minority groups in the reapportionment process");
Beauprez v. Avalos, 42 P.3d 642, 652 (Colo. 2002) (holding that division of economically
defined community of interest was justified "to preserve the historical Hispanic community of
interest in that part of the state"); see also Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 667
(Md. 1993) (approving a plan even though it split a "tightly-knit Jewish community ...
between three different legislative districts").
265. There is also a long legacy on the state level of the Progressive belief that race
and ethnicity are not only improper but dangerous bases for organizing politics. On the
Progressive hostility toward ethnic, machine-based, urban-style politics, see, for example,
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 9 (1955) (arguing that
Progressivism reacted against a conception of politics embraced by many immigrants that
"took for granted that the political life of the individual would arise out of family needs,
interpreted political and civic relations chiefly in terms of personal obligations, and placed
strong personal loyalties above allegiance to abstract codes of law or morals"); DENNIS R.
JUDD, THE POLmCS OF AMERICAN CrrIEs: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY 88-92 (1988)
(describing Progressive concern about municipal corruption caused by the lower classes and

2006]

FOREWORD

947

D. Territoryand Interest (II): Administrativeand PoliticalConstruction of
County Communities of Interest
We normally think of communities of interest as conceptually prior to
election districts: we create or recognize an election district precisely
because it contains a community of interest, thereby providing political voice
to a group with an antecedent claim to legislative representation. The
practice of recognizing counties as election districts on the ground that they
generally contain discrete, local economic communities of interest accords
well with this view. The arrow of causality, however, need not always point
in this direction. As Benedict Anderson has persuasively argued, the act of
drawing boundaries can sometimes precede the emergence of a community,
and indeed can under the right circumstances serve as a kind of armature
upon which new, politically coherent communities crystallize;
"administrative units," Anderson argues, can "over time, come to be
conceived as fatherlands. ' 66 This more subtle and sophisticated conception
of a community of interest also finds expression in the state constitutional
jurisprudence of apportionment, in two ways.
First, state courts have frequently found that residency in a county
creates what might very well be called an "administrative" community of
interest among the inhabitants, in virtue of their common experience under
the county's administration of governmental programs. Counties have
historically occupied'a significant place in the structure of state government.
In North Carolina, they "serve as the State's agents in administering
statewide programs, while also functioning as local governments that devise
rules and provide essential services to their citizens. 26 7 In Maryland,
immigrants, manifested in a reform agenda dedicated to abolishing machine politics). For an
account of the influence of the Progressives on state-level political reform during the early
twentieth century, see James A. Gardner, Madison's Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the
Design of ElectoralSystems, 86 IOWA L. REv. 87, 118-19 (2000).
266.

BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMuNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND

SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 53 (rev. ed. 1991). For an application of this concept to the
American states, see Russell Kirk, The Prospectsfor TerritorialDemocracy in America, in A
NATION OF STATES: ESSAYS ON THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 42, 43 & n.2 (Robert A.

Goldwin ed., 1963) ("[W]hile the highly arbitrary and abstract boundaries of the Western
states represent nothing but cartographers' and Congressmen's convenience, still the
institution and practice of territorial democracy have given to Montana and Arizona and
Kansas, say, some distinct and peculiar character as political territories, by fixing loyalties and
forming an enduring structure of political administration. . . . [T]he stabilizing and
conservative influence of the pattern of territorial democracy has... [made] sensible political
territories of what originally were mere parallelograms of prairie and desert and forest.").
267. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 385 (N.C. 2002).
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counties "'have traditionally exercised wide governmental powers in the
fields of education, welfare, police, taxation, roads, sanitation, health and the
administration of justice,"' and they therefore play a role in state governance
"'analogous to [the role of] the states, in relation to the United States.' 21 68
This extensive administrative activity establishes significant relationships
both between county residents and their government, and among county
residents, thereby forging a community of interest even where one might not
otherwise exist. As the Colorado Supreme Court recently observed,
"[c]ounties and the cities within their boundaries are already established as
communities of interest in their own right, with a functioning legal and
' 269
physical local government identity on behalf of citizens that is ongoing.
Or, in the words of the New Jersey Supreme Court, "[t]he citizens of each
county have a community of interest by virtue of their common
responsibility to provide for public needs and their investment in the plants
and facilities established to that end. 2 70 Representation by county is further
justified, on this view, by the need for each administrative community of
interest to have "a separate voice in its relations with the State."27'
Second, state courts have often found that common participation by a
county's inhabitants in its electoral politics, and in the reciprocal
relationships established between those inhabitants and their elected officials,
gives rise to a political community of interest entitled to recognition. The
Virginia Supreme Court, for example, has held that maintaining the stability
of a "district's configuration" is an important consideration in redistricting
because it "allow[s] development of relationships and communities of
interest relative to election of delegates. 272 The Vermont Supreme Court has
268. In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d 292, 319 (Md. 2002) (quoting Md.
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 184 A.2d 715, 718 (1962)). Although many states
deliberately utilized a "federal plan" in which representation in the state senate was, as in the
federal model, by territorial subunit rather than by population, see PAUL T. DAVID & RALPH
EISENBERG, STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICING: MAJOR ISSUES IN THE WAKE OF JUDICIAL

5-13 (1962), any analogy between the national method of electing senators by state
and the state method of electing state senators by county was flatly rejected by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 571-76 (1964).
269. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1248 (Colo.
DECISION

2002).
270. Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (N.J. 1964); see also In re
Reapportionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 672 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting) (stating that residents of local government units have "common interests in the
economic, residential, recreational and educational betterment of their communities").
271. Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 291 A.2d 134, 141 (N.J. 1972).
272. Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 110 (Va. 2002); see also Wilkins v. Davis, 139
S.E.2d 849, 850-51 (Va. 1965) ("'[In Virginia, it has been the unbroken custom to refrain
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similarly held that "the preservation of town and county boundaries is
important 'because the sense of community derived from established
governmental units tends to foster effective representation.' '2 73 The North
Carolina Supreme Court has gone even further, holding that these relations
give rise not merely to a community of interest, but to a significant and
independent political identity:
[Pleople identify themselves as residents of their counties and customarily
interact most frequently with their government at the county level. Based on
the clear identity and common interests that counties provide, the impetus for
the preservation of county lines [under 274
the state constitution] is easily
understood within the redistricting context.

On this view, then, even if local political boundaries do not coincide
precisely with the physical extent of a local economy, administrative and
political dynamics are at work within counties and towns to create
communities of interest among the residents that are entitled to
representation in the state legislature.27 5

from dividing any county or city into separate districts. From the early history of Virginia,
even in Colonial days, the community of interests in the respective counties has been
recognized, and in no division of the state for any governmental purpose has any county line
been broken."' (quoting Brown v. Saunders, 166 S.E. 105, 107-08 (Va. 1932))).
273. In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
323, 330 (Vt. 1993) (quoting Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68, 88 (D. Colo. 1982)); see
also id. ("'[Tihe ability of representatives to relate effectively to their constituency"' is
"fostered through... membership in a political community" (quoting Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d
545, 553 (Cal. 1992))).
274. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 386 (N.C. 2002) (citation omitted).
275. This view of the matter does not merely reflect some kind of tautology of
apportionment itself, i.e., that election districts become communities of interest because they
are election districts and therefore elect representatives. Although such a dynamic is certainly
possible, and election districts may be logically viewed as communities of interest for certain
limited purposes, the decisions discussed here seem to contemplate a community of greater
thickness. An election "district," by itself, has no functions of administration or governance.
The account given in the text seems to apply, rather, to local governments with autonomous
powers of governance that therefore have the capacity, through the activity of local selfgovernance, to constitute a meaningful community. A district that has no existence other than
the election of a legislator presumably would not generate the same breadth of communityinducing activity.
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E. Summary
In sum, the state constitutional jurisprudence of apportionment expresses
a reasonably clear, dominant, and historically continuous view:
representation in the state legislature is of local political units, which are
conceived to embrace distinct, coherent groupings of people engaged in
shared economic activity-and, to a lesser extent, administrative and
political activity-thereby giving rise to communities of primarily economic
interest entitled to separate legislative representation.
It is worth stressing once more the considerable differences between the
federal and state views of the nature of communities of interest. The
dominant state view is what might be called an "inductive," or "bottom-up"
theory of community: it proceeds upon the fundamentally republican or
communitarian premise that people who live in close physical proximity
inevitably share certain kinds of activities, and that the bonds created through
these shared activities give rise to a community of interest that is deeply
connected to, built upon the matrix of, even induced by, the particular
locality in which the members live.27 6 The dominant federal approach 277 is
276. See Forest, supra note 225, at 157 ("Under the theory of regional community
representation propinquity is important because political interests, preferences, and identityas well as moral obligations-are formed and defined by local geographic communities, rather
than existing a priori in autonomous individuals.").
277. A view more akin to the state position has occasionally been advanced, generally
without much success, on the federal level. For example, in Karcher v. Daggett, Justice
Stevens argued that "[r]esidents of political units such as townships, cities, and counties often
develop a community of interest, particularly when the subdivision plays an important role in
the provision of governmental services," 462 U.S. 725, 758 (Stevens, J., concurring), but did
not attract any other votes. A few lower federal courts have occasionally expressed the view
that local governments can form a constitutive matrix for the formation of cognizable
communities of interests. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Hudnut, 566 F.2d 30, 35-36 (7th Cir. 1977)
("[AII residents of the county share a community of interests in the proper operation of the
police and fire districts as well as the city-county government of which they are a part.");
Smith v. Cobb County Bd. of Elections, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
("[S]trong communities of interest . . . exist around the attendance zones for the high schools
in the County, as well as the elementary and middle 'feeder schools' that send students to
those high schools."); Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 648
(D.S.C. 2002) (three-judge panel) ("Many governmental services, such as fire and police
protection, are organized along political subdivision lines, and counties and cities are often
representative of a naturally existing community of interest."). On the other hand, at least one
lower court has expressly rejected any connection between place and community of interest on
the ground that it would make any requirement of geographical compactness redundant. See
Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 516 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting argument that
"communities of interest were inherently linked to geography" on the ground that "this
statement would make communities of interest a mere subset of geographic compactness").
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more "deductive," or top-down, to say nothing of classically liberal and
cosmopolitan. On the federal view, individuals, who are not intrinsically
connected to any particular locality, happen to share political interestsoften defined in terms of interests salient to national politics-and then
happen to reside in a particular place. 7 8 In the federal jurisprudence, the
place or local community is therefore of no great importance, at least in
comparison to the community of interest constituted by an individual's
membership in territorially cross-cutting groups organized by politics,
ideology or other kinds of interests.
The bottom-up dynamic contemplated by the state approach is perhaps
easiest to see in the case of governmental administration, in which all
residents of an established county or town, whatever their other
characteristics, are understood to coalesce into a community of interest by
virtue of living under the same regime of governmental administration. On
this view, the community of interest constituted by Franklin County could
not exist anywhere but in Franklin County because living together in
Franklin County, under Franklin County's administration of state policies
and Franklin County's policies of local governance, is precisely what gives
rise to the community. That makes the relevant community not only
intrinsically local, but intrinsically connected to a particular locality.
The same is just as true of the state view of counties as economic
communities of interest. The idea is not that people who live in a county
happen to share the trait of being economic actors, and that a county is as
good a way as any other to group economic actors for purposes of
representation. Instead, the idea seems to be that people who live in close
physical proximity inevitably engage in economic relations with each other,
and that this relationship, multiplied many times over for some decent
interval, gives rise to both a local economy in that place-which
consequently possesses unique attributes that distinguish it from any other
local economy in any other place-along with a corresponding community
of interest comprised of the people whose activity constitutes the local
economy, and whose prosperity is therefore linked directly to it. 279 For
278. Again, Forest has put the point well: "[judicial approaches to districting] share the
assumption that an individual voter (or census block) has no inherent place in any particular
district. That is, the placement of a voter in a district reflects the optimal solution to an
allocation problem, not a normative judgment about the membership of that voter in a
particular community." Forest, supra note 225, at 156.
279. Ironically, on this republican account of commerce, the economic behavior of
individuals in the marketplace, which is usually conceived on a liberal view as atomistic and
destructive of community, is here conceived as constitutive of community. Yet the assumption
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purposes of representation, on this view, it therefore makes no sense to
conceive of the residents of Franklin County as individuals with an interest
in the prosperity of local economies. Their interest is in the prosperity of the
Franklin County local economy, and the only way to represent that interest in
the state legislature-assuming, of course that this is the kind of interest that
should be represented there, a subject to which I shall return shortly-is to
280
provide representation to the county community of economic interest.
To be sure, one might dispute this state approach to legislative
representation as unrealistic. First, it may no longer be true, if indeed it ever
was, that county boundaries demarcate the limits of local economies. Even in
1776, urban merchants and town and village tradesmen across any given
state may well have had more economic interests in common with one
another than they had with farmers and agricultural workers in their home
counties. 28 And of course there is nothing intrinsic to the structure of
counties or towns that impedes the spread of local economies across their
borders.282 Furthermore, the conflation of territory and economic interest
may well overstate the extent to which the interests of participants in a local
of an underlying harmony of American economic interests was pervasive in the late nineteenth
century. See generally MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA (1977).
280. Writing of the national constitutional experience, Zagarri claims that "[d]espite
the Federalists' ultimate triumph, spatial assumptions about representation died hard."
ZAGARRI, supra note 28, at 104. I would amend this. In the state constitutional realm,
Antifederalist assumptions about representation did not die at all, but have lingered on, albeit
in a weakened condition.
281.
This may depend in part on when one looks. In colonial times, although "[e]ven
the smallest village had some trade beyond its immediate neighborhood[,]" the lives of
villagers "were not shaped or even touched by participation in an abstract and competitive
market society; they were in the market, but not of it." BENDER, supra note 213, at 66. "The
local village or neighborhood, integrated by face-to-face and intimate relationships, often
based upon kinship networks, was the colony's basic economic unit." Id at 70. By the
antebellum period, divergences in economic interests between town and countryside may,
according to at least one account, have been so strong as to provide an armature for the
emergence of the competitive political parties of the second party system. See generally
HARRY L. WATSON, JACKSONIAN PoLrICs AND COMMUNITY CONFLICT: THE EMERGENCE OF
THE SECOND AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM INCUMBERLAND COUNTY NORTH CAROLINA (1981).
Certainly, by the time of the runup to the Civil War, economic differences could serve as the
basis for highly meaningful political cleavages. See, e.g., CLEMENT EATON, THE MIND OF THE
OLD SOUTH 60-62 (1964) (describing the conflict over secession between Southern planters,
who profited from slavery and therefore supported secession, and Southern merchants, who
did not profit from slavery and therefore opposed secession as financially harmful).
282. Indeed, official attempts to prevent the spread of economies in accordance with
market forces would very likely run afoul of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
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economy coincide. One of the realities of economic life is that one person's
gain may be another's loss-when business is good at the sunglasses shack,
the umbrella vendor may be languishing-and where participants in a local
economy compete, their interests may conflict.
Second, it might be the case, as Justice John Dooley of the Vermont
Supreme Court has argued, that the interests along which the residents of a
town or county are in fact most likely to cleave politically are not local
economic interests, but cross-cutting economic issues of statewide political
concern:
I think the majority has accepted a shallow and incomplete notion of
community of interest that ignores the reality of the tasks facing the
legislators who represent these districts. This opinion is issued at the start of
a legislative session in which the major concerns are the level of state
taxation and the nature of those taxes, the level of state spending and the
areas in which the spending occurs, creating jobs and income growth to
counteract the effect of the recession, and regulatory reform. There is
absolutely nothing in the sparse evidence produced by [the Town of]
Montgomery to show that the residents of that town have a common interest
in how these issues are
resolved with the residents of [neighboring] towns in
283
the adjoining district.

If this view is correct, communities of interest may be much less likely than
state courts assume to coalesce along county lines.
Third, the belief expressed in the cases that local administration and
political life give rise to meaningful communities of interest may be overly,
or even wildly, optimistic. Contemporary American political life is largely
characterized by disengagement; 284 Americans dislike politics, and have no

283. In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
323, 350 (Vt. 1993) (Dooley, J., dissenting in part).
284. If a lack of knowledge of politics is an indicator of disengagement, then
Americans are highly disengaged: volumes of political science research have documented
American voters' lack of knowledge and understanding of politics and political issues. The
locus classicus is ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960). For more recent

evidence,

see MIcHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & ScoTr KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOw ABOUT

POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996). For a more interpretive, sociological account, see
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REvwvAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNrrY 336-49 (2000) (describing the impact of declining social capital on democratic
participation and citizenship skills).

R UTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37:881

great enthusiasm for having it forced upon them,2 85 and this phenomenon is
more pronounced in every respect the more local the politics. Voter turnout,
for example, is low enough in national elections, but is even lower in state
and local elections, 286 and the salience of state-level issues for voters is lower
than for national issues.287 Thus, to claim that local activities of
governmental administration and politics constitute communities of interest
may overstate the case.
My goal here, however, is not so much to explore the empirical realities
of state legislative representation as it is to uncover the theories of legislative
representation upon which state constitutional apportionment provisions rest.
Constitutions often incorporate design assumptions about politics and human
behavior that are later contradicted by the facts, and if that is the case here, it
is certainly nothing new. For present purposes, I am therefore much less
interested in the possibility that communities of local economic interest
organized around county or town economies might not exist, or might exist
only weakly, than I am in the fact that state courts seem to assume that such
communities exist, consider such communities to play an extremely
important role in apportionment, and generally deduce that role from the
scheme of legislative representation established in their state constitutions.
For these reasons, I want to extend the analysis another step by moving
from consideration of state constitutional systems of apportionment to state
constitutional systems of politics, broadly conceived. Apportionment is not
an end in itself; it is a mechanism, like many other legal mechanisms,
designed to institutionalize some kind of politics that the society in question
considers desirable. Consequently, if we know something about a society's
rules of legislative representation and apportionment-and we now know a
285. This point is made with great force in JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISSMORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS' BELIEF ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD
WORK 85-159 (2002).
286. Since 1980, voter turnout in presidential election years has hovered just above
fifty percent, while during the same period voter turnout in non-presidential election years
(i.e., years in which elections for state offices need share the ballot only with federal
congressional or senatorial races) has on only one occasion been as high as forty percent, and
typically hovers in the mid-thirty-percent range. HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI,
VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS, 2001-2002, at 13 tbl.1-1 (2001).
287. Examples are legion; here is one. In a March, 2006, CBS News poll, respondents
were asked to name "the most important problem facing this country today." By far the most
common response was the war in Iraq, followed by the economy and jobs, terrorism, health
care, energy issues, foreign policy, and immigration. PollingReport.com, Problems and
Priorities, http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2006). This is a list
heavily weighted toward national issues.
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considerable amount about such rules for the American states-we can
probably make some fair inferences about the kind of political life these rules
are meant to achieve. In the next Part, I therefore ask the following question:
given the assumptions about legislative apportionment woven through the
jurisprudence described above, what kind of state-level politics is
contemplated by this system of representation?
My answer, in brief, is this: state constitutional apportionment rules seem
to contemplate a state-level politics that is classically republican, and that
therefore holds no meaningful place for political parties. This will turn out to
be a useful piece of information when we finally address the main question
posed in this paper: do state constitutional anti-gerrymandering provisions
hold any promise for controlling partisan gerrymandering? The answer, I
suggest, is that they do not.
V. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICS

What kind of state politics, then, are state constitutional apportionment
provisions, and the court-made apportionment jurisprudence construing
them, intended to create? From the many provisions and judicial decisions
examined above, it is possible to extract three closely related main features:
(1) a delegate model of representation; (2) an intradistrict politics that is
harmonious rather than conflictual; and (3) a state-level politics that is
pluralistic, conflictual, and oriented toward resolution of local, economic
issues. Taken together, these features gesture strongly toward a politics that
is fundamentally republican, and bears a strong family resemblance to the
anti-party kind of politics closely associated with eighteenth century
American political thought.28 8
A. The DelegateModel of Representation
In a democracy, it is to be expected that on many or most issues citizens
will hold a wide variety of views and that many of these views will conflict.
Every democratic system of governance therefore faces the fundamental
question of how to reduce a multiplicity of citizen views to a single view, or
set of views, expressed in collectively determined legislative policies. One of
288.

For an overview of early American antipathy toward political parties, see

generally

RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 (1969); GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF
PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

INJACKSONIAN ILLINOIS (2002).
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the main distinctions between forms of democracy concerns where within the
system, and by what means, the necessary conflict resolution occurs.
In representative democracies, one variable that affects how conflicting
views are resolved is the homogeneity of legislative constituencies. If voters
within the various districts are relatively homogeneous, and therefore have
similar political opinions, then the selection by the people of the district of a
legislative representative does not resolve any conflicts because as yet there
are none to be resolved; the representative will necessarily hold the same
views as his or her constituents. Assuming that representatives so elected are
themselves politically heterogeneous, then conflicting political views will be
resolved in the legislature by bargaining or debate among the legislators.
Such a system, characterized by intradistrict homogeneity and interdistrict
heterogeneity, corresponds to a theory of representation-commonplace
during the eighteenth century and best articulated by John Adams and The
Essex Result-in which the legislature is said to "be in miniature an exact
portrait of the people at large[,]" and will therefore act precisely as the
people would were they able to be physically present themselves.2 89
A different kind of system is established if election districts are
constructed so as to be heterogeneous, composed of voters who hold diverse
political views. In such a system, the election of a representative by the
people of a district will itself constitute a first-pass resolution of conflicting
views by the voters themselves, resulting in the election of a representative
whose positions already embody some degree of political compromise. If,
after district elections, representatives still hold heterogeneous views in the
legislature-as will surely be the case-there will then be another round of
conflict resolution when the representatives deliberate and bargain among
themselves. In this system, however, we would expect the range of conflict
among the legislators to be narrower, because a first round of compromise
has already occurred among the electorate in the district elections. This
model corresponds roughly to the median voter theory of contemporary
political science.290
289. John Adams, Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present State of the
American Colonies, in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMs 287, 288-89 (C.
Bradley Thompson ed., 2000); see The Essex Result (Apr. 29, 1778), reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONsTrruION, supra note 165, at 112-18. For a discussion of this theory of
"descriptive representation," see HANNA FENICHEL PrrKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION
60-91 (1967).
290. The classic statement of the median voter theory appears in ANTHONY DOwNs,
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). For more recent elaborations of the theory, see
generally MICHAEL D. McDONALD & IAN BUDGE,

ELECTIONS, PARTIEs, DEMOCRACY:
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A society may very well end up with more or less the same ultimate
policies regardless of which of these conflict-resolution systems it chooses,
but the function of representatives in each system will be quite different. In
the first model, where district voters are homogeneous, all conflict resolution
occurs in the legislature and none in the electorate, essentially making
representatives delegates of their respective constituencies:2 91 their function
in the legislature is to represent and pursue the interests of their districts in
bargaining and deliberation with other representatives of other homogeneous
districts. Because their constituents do not disagree among themselves and
share a unity of interest, representatives have little occasion to exercise
independent discretion; they function more as agents whose job is to
represent and advance the interests of their constituents. In the second model,
however, where district voters are heterogeneous and have conflicting
interests and political opinions, representatives are necessarily conciliators
among different interest groups within their own constituencies. They cannot
simply represent their constituents' opinions and interests because those
opinions and interests conflict, and representatives must therefore use some
independent judgment to decide which set of conflicting views to take up, or
how to fashion a synthetic position to advance in the legislature that will
provide the greatest overall benefit to their various constituencies. The
precise position taken by such representatives may in many cases correspond
to a position that is held by very few voters in the district, or even by none. 92
The many state constitutional apportionment provisions and judicial
decisions reviewed in Parts Ill and IV suggest fairly strongly that the
dominant state constitutional model of legislative representation corresponds
closely to the delegate model. First, it is implicit in the commonplace view of
political subdivisions as naturally occurring, homogeneous communities of
economic interest. Each county or town is understood in this jurisprudence to
be unique, yet unified-unique because each unit is its own local economy,
as well as its own administrative and political community, but internally

CONFERRING THE MEDIAN MANDATE (2005); G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS (2000).

See PMIN, supra note 289, at 133-34, 146-47, 150-51, for a discussion of the
291.
delegate model of representation.
292. The prediction of Downsian voting theory is that the representative will take up
the position of the median voter, even if that person is the only one in the district to hold that
precise opinion, provided that voter preferences are single-peaked. DOWNS, supra note 290, at
117-19.
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unified because all who participate in these communities of interests have, by
definition, the same interests.293
This view of the matter finds additional support in the belief, expressed
occasionally by state courts, that counties and other local government units
should not be divided because doing so impairs the efficacy of legislative
representation. For example, according to the Maryland Court of Appeals,
"[t]he danger lurking in legislative districts which cross jurisdictional
boundaries . . . is that representatives from those districts may face
conflicting allegiances as to legislative initiatives which benefit one of their
constituencies at the expense of the other.' '294 The Vermont Supreme Court
has expressed a similar concern: "Voters in a community are less effectively
represented when their elected representative's principal constituency lies
outside their community and has interests different from their own. 29 5 This
kind of concern clearly presupposes that each county is a coherent whole and
that a district that crosses county lines is therefore a congeries of unrelated,
or at least heterogeneous interests, creating a potential conflict. But a
representative can have a professional conflict of interest in such a situation
only if it is not a legitimate function of representatives to resolve competing
claims and interests arising from within their own districts-if, that is to say,
their job is simply to follow the instructions of their constituencies,
something that is possible to do without "conflict" only if the instructions

293.

See BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 64 (1984) ("If a legislator

represents an area with a single, well-defined interest, then his mandate will be
unambiguous.").
294. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 666 (Md. 1993).
295. In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d
323, 330 (Vt. 1993). Similar opinions have been expressed by dissenting justices in
Pennsylvania and Colorado. See In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d
1237, 1263 (Colo. 2002) (Bender, J., dissenting) (criticizing system of assigning
representatives to more populous counties and splitting up less populous counties to round out
district populations as resulting in superior representation for the more populous counties); In
re Reapportionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 672 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting) ("[O]nce political subdivisions have been split, there is little chance that the
interests of their residents will be represented effectively so long as their elected
representatives also represent other areas with different interests."). On the other hand, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has flatly denied that dividing a county impairs its representation:
"[I]f the county is ignored in drawing district lines, its interests will not go unrepresented. A
Senator must be mindful of the interests of the county or counties in which his constituents
live." Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 291 A.2d 134, 142 (N.J. 1972). But see Jensen v. Ky. State
Bd. of Elections, 959 S.W.2d 771, 775 (Ky. 1997) ("[T]he delegates [to the 1890
constitutional convention] did not intend to guarantee that a county must be represented by a
resident of that county.").
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issue from constituencies that are themselves without conflicting interests,
i.e., homogeneous.
The delegate model of representation is further supported by the
commonplace notion, set out in Part IV.D, of counties as administrative
subdivisions of the state. If the counties are the chief downward conduits for
the implementation of state policy-the vehicles by which state power is
transmitted to the local level-it is not unreasonable to conceive of them
simultaneously as reciprocal upward conduits for the transmission of local
interests to the state level. Such an arrangement makes state legislators more
like shuttling messengers than like trustees entitled to exercise independent
judgment.
Finally, the delegate model is squarely implicated in the venerable belief
that the people in a democracy retain a right to "instruct" their legislative
representatives, an idea that was squarely rejected on the national level,296
but that made significant headway in the states. The right to instruct appeared
in numerous early state constitutions,29 7 and to this date appears in the

296. As Madison famously observed, one of the most significant features of the U.S.
Constitution is its "total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity, from any share in
[governance]." THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison), supra note 103, at 387 (emphasis
omitted). Instead, government is to be conducted by men of wisdom and virtue pursuing
independently "the true interest of their country." Id., No. 10, at 82. Later, as a representative
in the First Congress shepherding the Bill of Rights through the House, Madison was even
more direct: "If gentlemen mean to go further [than to say that citizens have a right to
communicate their sentiments to their representatives], and to say that the people have a right
to instruct their representatives in such a sense as that the delegates were obliged to conform
to those instructions, the declaration is not true." CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 167 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds.,
1991).
297. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVIII; PA. CONST. of
1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVI; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, § XVIII; MASS. CONST. of
1780, pt. I, art. XIX; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. I, § XXXII (1784); ME. CONST. of 1819, art. I, §
15. For discussions of the right to instruct in its early American context, see KRUMAN, supra
note 27, at 76-81; POLE, supra note 82, at 541-42; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 189-96, 379-83 (1969); see also PrrKiN, supra note 289,
at 133-35 (discussing the instruction of representatives as a matter of the theory of
representation).
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constitutions of fourteen states, 298 although such provisions have generally
been construed by state courts to have little real bite.299
B. HarmoniousIntradistrictPolitics
As suggested in the preceding section, a delegate model of representation
generally goes hand in hand with the belief that district constituencies are
basically homogeneous, and that they therefore contain populations whose
interests are fundamentally similar. This view of constituencies is linked to
the delegate model because a district constituency that contains diverse and
conflicting interests is not easily capable of settling on a single, clear,
internally consistent set of instructions for delegate-representatives to follow.
Also implicit in this model of representation, however, is an important
conception of the kind of politics that will prevail in such a district: it will be
harmonious. If the citizens of a district have homogeneous interests, there
will be little of substance for them to disagree about in intradistrict politics,
and their main challenge at election time will be not to reach agreement on
the substantive policies they wish to see advanced in the state legislature, but
merely to agree upon who is the person best qualified to advance the interests
and policies upon which they ought in principle readily to agree.
The state constitutional jurisprudence of apportionment by and large
follows this general pattern. First, as indicated in Part IV.C, state courts
construing state constitutional apportionment provisions generally conceive
of the inhabitants of counties and other local government units as coherent
communities of economic interest, thereby attributing to them a homogeneity
of interest corresponding to a perceived unity of county-based local
economies. The dominant interests of the district polity, that is to say, are
homogeneous, and we would therefore on this view expect the district's
internal politics to be reasonably harmonious. Second, the idea of a unity of
district interest is further reinforced by the commonplace state constitutional
practice, described in Part HI.B, of providing for separate treatment in the
apportionment process of counties and large cities, especially the practice of
298. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 10; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 31; KAN.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 3; ME. CONST. art. I, § 15; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XIX; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 10; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 12; OIno CONST. art. I, § 3;
OR. CONST. art. I, § 26; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 23; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 20; W. VA. CONST. art.
III, § 16.
299. See, e.g., Fuller v. Haines, 112 N.E. 873, 874 (Mass. 1916) (refusing to find that
Article 19 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights authorized the citizens of a locality to
bind the actions of their municipal representatives).
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confining them to separate election districts. This practice reflects the belief,
widespread during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries
(and persisting to some extent even today), that residents of urban and rural
areas have distinct-though internally homogeneous-3interests. 3 00
A third indication that state constitutions have historically presupposed
an internally harmonious district-level politics is the widespread use of atlarge elections from areas sufficiently populous to elect more than one
legislator. As we saw in Part flI.D, multimember districting was, until the
1840s, the preferred method of election for both state legislative chambers,
and persisted in many places well into the twentieth century. An electoral
system in which residents of a single area collectively elect multiple
representatives presupposes a significant unity of interest and a strong
foundation of substantive agreement among voters. Subdistricting of
populous areas, in contrast, is warranted only if the district contains a
multiplicity of interests that must be separately represented. 0 1
C. State-Level Politics: Conflictual,Economic, and Local
The final piece of this conceptual system concerns the nature of politics
at the state level. In the system most often constructed by state constitutional
apportionment provisions, the state legislature is likely to serve as the main
300. Jefferson, certainly, was one of the earliest and most influential proponents of this
view: "Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God ....
whose breasts He has
made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue.... The mobs of great cities add
just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human
body." Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 185, 280 (Adrienne Koch and William Peden eds., 1944). For an account
of urban-rural conflict in Congress during the early twentieth century, see generally EAGLES,
supra note 106; for accounts of how such conflict played out in reapportionment, see GORDON
E. BAKER, RURAL VERSUS URBAN POLITICAL POWER: THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF

UNBALANCED REPRESENTATION 11-25, 40-52 (1955); ROYCE HANSON, THE POLMCAL
THICKET: REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTrUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 19-28 (1966); MALCOLM E.
JEWELL, THE STATE LEGISLATURE: POLrICS AND PRACTICE 18-19 (1962).
301.
See, e.g., ZAGARRI, supra note 28, at 59 ("[U]nder corporate representation a
legislator represented the general interests of the whole community rather than the particular
interests of its more specialized parts."). Another justification occasionally advanced for
subdividing districts, particularly during the nineteenth century, was that they were either so
large or so populous that residents of different parts of the district could not possibly know
and evaluate candidates drawn from other parts of the district. See REHFELD, supra note 207,
at 79-80; ZAGARRI, supra note 28, at 20-21, 88-89, 91-93, 101-03. But since interest was in
this period understood as intimately related to place, such a situation was, for the most part,
understood as the equivalent of a divergence of interest within the district, thereby requiring
subdivision. See ZAGARRI, supra note 28, at 98-99.
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locus for the emergence and resolution of political conflict. Given the
contemplated composition of local communities of interest, moreover, the
primary basis of conflict within the state legislature will likely concern the
resolution of competing local economic claims.
This view of state legislative politics follows readily from the
characteristics of state legislative representation already described. First, any
system in which election districts contain homogeneous, reasonably unified
communities of interest will likely shift the locus of political conflict from
the district to the legislative level. Since district residents have shared
interests, they will by definition have few political conflicts among
themselves, and each district's internal politics may be harmonious. The
diversity of interest statewide, however, is represented in the legislature,
which serves essentially as a meeting place for representatives of internally
homogeneous, but collectively diverse communities of interest. °2 The
typical structure of state constitutional apportionment provisions thus
appears to contemplate a state political life that is harmonious at the local
level but conflictual at the state level. This arrangement is also consistent
with the conception of representatives as delegates, for it appears to be a
system in which the task of resolving political conflict is everywhere
delegated from the people to their representatives. The people, on this view,
apparently wish to be spared the burden of political conflict; they prefer to
live harmoniously among themselves in homogeneous and politically
peaceful local communities, and 3send
their representatives off to the state
03
capital to do battle on their behalf.
Second, given the contemplated composition of the districts, the main
subject of state legislative conflict is likely to be economic, and because the
representatives are delegates of the interests of unique county economies, the
main source of conflict is likely to revolve around competing claims
advanced in the service of local economic prosperity. As a result, state
politics on this model might well involve consideration of demands by
localities concerning such matters as the investment of statewide resources,
302. An extreme example of this phenomenon is given by Zuckerman in his account of
the politics of eighteenth-century Massachusetts: "Independent towns, each straining for its
own internal accord, could not support political parties which cut across town lines. The very
same premium on peace which precluded pluralism within the towns almost assured it in the
capital, where pluralism ran rampant .... The result was a milling and pushing politics of
individuals in Boston which was probably dignified rather than demeaned by the label of
factionalism." ZUCKERMAN, supra note 226, at 224-25. Pole makes a similar point about
Virginia. See POLE, supra note 82, at 125 ("The Assembly gradually came to represent a sort
of federation of county oligarchies .... ").
303. See HmBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 285, at 85-159.
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including public works and economic development projects; requests for
state regulatory intervention favorable to local economic conditions, such as
tax relief or assistance to local industries; or public programs beneficial to
local residents, such as health, education, or housing programs. In short,
structuring democratic politics in this way seems calculated to produce a
politics dealing predominantly with issues that are particular to the various
economic units that make up the state, and are therefore by definition highly
local; it is a bottom-up kind of politics well suited to a bottom-up conception
of political community.
The state constitutional structure also suggests a fairly strong conception
of what democratic self-rule means, in the sense of what it means for a
constituency to control its fate: in this structure, self-rule for a community
means having the opportunity to defend or advance its economic interests
and prosperity in the corridors of state government. Although this is by
contemporary standards perhaps a somewhat narrow conception of the
meaning of collective democratic self-rule, it is a conception that resonates
strongly through American history: the belief that representation is valuable
because of the opportunity it offers individuals and communities to protect
their financial and commercial interests stretches as far back as the
Revolution.
D. State ConstitutionalConceptions of Gerrymandering
With this outline of state constitutional conceptions of politics sketched
in, we are finally in a position to ask directly the question around which we
have slowly been circling: what, according to the dominant state
constitutional jurisprudence of apportionment, is gerrymandering, and what,
precisely, is wrong with it? The answer is threefold. First, gerrymandering is
the artificial division of natural local economic communities. Second,
gerrymandering is the destruction of a harmonious local politics and its
replacement with an artificially created local politics of conflict. Third,
gerrymandering is the displacement of a state politics that revolves,
appropriately, around issues of local economic concern in favor of a state
politics that revolves, inappropriately, around false and manufactured issues
of ideology, party, and faction.
When all is right with an apportionment scheme, on this view, election
district lines match up with naturally occurring, distinct local economies,
something that happens, for the most part, when district lines coincide with
the counties, cities, or towns that comprise the various local economies. This
arrangement of its own force then produces the desired politics: harmonious
at home due to the unity of local economic interest; conflictual far away in
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the state legislature due to the diversity of local economic communities and
the consequent diversity of the interests represented by legislative delegates;
and economic in both places because constituencies have been constructed
around economic interests. 3 4
A gerrymandered district-one that does not respect the boundaries of
economic communities of interest-destroys all three of these qualities at
once. By dividing local economies and grouping them in ways that fail to
track the patterns of naturally occurring economic interactions, the economic
coherence of election districts is by definition undermined. That much is
clear. But what kinds of districts are produced in their place? More to the
point, what happens to the politics of a district gerrymandered so as to
contain incomplete portions of two or more local economies? One inevitable
result would seem to be that the internal politics of the district will become
conflictual. At the very least, those district residents whose lives are centered
in separate local economies may find their interests in conflict during district
electoral politics, and the resolution of these conflicts, a task previously
delegated to representatives, will suddenly become the immediate business
of the voters themselves, to be attended to in the selection of the district's
representative or senator. As a result, political harmony is sacrificed and
replaced with a politics of conflict and public contestation that is presumably
infinitely less pleasant and neighborly than the ideal politics contemplated by
the dominant state constitutional model.
Even worse from the point of view of this model, however, is that
gerrymandering may very well produce another undesirable consequence:
partisanship. This is not, to be sure, how we conventionally understand the
relationship between partisanship and gerrymandering. The conventional
contemporary view is that partisanship causes gerrymandering by furnishing
incentives to the politicians who perform reapportionment to draw district
lines for political advantage. This is of course undeniable, and many state
courts have readily acknowledged that partisan considerations routinely
factor into apportionment decisions.30 5 However, on the set of assumptions
304. On the relationship between the structure of election districts and the
characteristics of their politics, see REHFELD, supra note 207, at 7.
305. See, e.g., Burris v. Ryan, 588 N.E.2d 1023, 1028 (Ill. 1991) ("Politics and
political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); Jensen v. Ky. State Bd. of Elections, 959 S.W.2d 771, 776
(Ky. 1997) ("Apportionment is primarily a political and legislative process."); In re 2003
Legislative Apportionment of House of Representatives, 827 A.2d 810, 815 (Me. 2003)
("Apportionment legislation does not become invalid because it takes into account political
considerations or is politically motivated."); In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d
292, 326 (Md. 2002) ("[B]ecause the process is partly a political one . . . political
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that typically characterize state constitutional apportionment regimes, the
reverse also seems to be true: gerrymandering is not merely a symptom of
partisanship, but a cause of it. How can this be?
Gerrymandering, on this view, causes partisanship precisely because it
disregards the "natural" territorial cleavages-local economic ones-that
divide the state populace. The disregard of natural cleavages necessarily
impedes the emergence of a politics organized along natural lines, and the
only kind of politics capable of emerging in such an environment must by
definition be one organized around cleavages that are false and artificially
constructed. What might these cleavages be? The most likely cleavage is one
of party, or its close cousin, ideological partisanship. This conclusion follows
from two different accounts, one historical and the other functional.
The state constitutional approaches to apportionment that we have been
examining are rooted firmly in eighteenth-century American political
thought.3 °6 In this body of thought, parties and partisanship were viewed with
deep suspicion and hostility.30 7 Political parties, according to the prevailing
considerations and judgments may be, and often are, brought to bear."); Davenport v.
Apportionment Comm'n, 319 A.2d 718, 722 (N.J. 1974) ("Political considerations are
inherent in districting."); People ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 31 N.E. 921, 928 (N.Y. 1892)
(redistricting is "[in its nature... political"); Jamerson v. Womack, 423 S.E.2d 180, 182 (Va.
1992) ("reapportionment 'is, in a sense, political' (quoting Brown v. Saunders, 166 S.E. 105,
107 (Va. 1932))); cf Kawamoto v. Okata, 868 P.2d 1183, 1189 (Haw. 1994) (redistricting to
protect incumbents is not per se improper).
306. Part III, supra, demonstrated a fundamentally continuous state constitutional
approach to gerrymandering originating with provisions devised in the late eighteenth century.
For works specifically discussing the influence of eighteenth-century political thought on state
constitutions, see ADAMS, supra note 26 (explaining the influence of eighteenth-century
republican ideology on the earliest state constitutions); KRUMAN, supra note 27 (discussing
applications of republican political theory to state constitutional handling of questions of
constitutional theory, popular sovereignty, representation, suffrage, and other matters); TARR,
supra note 13, at 90 (observing that the U.S. Constitution had limited influence on early state
constitutions, which had been drafted under the influence of antifederalist principles); WOOD,
supra note 297, at 134 (describing the first wave of American state constitution making as
proceeding under an idea of politics "conceived in conventional Whig terms"); Jim Rossi,
InstitutionalDesign and the Lingering Legacy ofAntifederalist Separationof Powers Ideals in
the States, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1167 (1999) (arguing that aspects of antifederalist political
theory have survived in many state constitutions).
307. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 288, at 9 (arguing that the "root idea" of AngloAmerican political thought concerning parties was that "parties are evil"); see also, e.g.,
George Washington, Farewell Address, in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 169, 172
(Henry Steele Commager ed., 8th ed. 1968) (warning against "the baneful effects of the spirit
of party"). This view was revived in the early twentieth century by the Progressives, who
believed that partisanship was an artificial distraction from the ideologically neutral, scientific
administration of public affairs, and who implemented their vision with a highly successful
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dogma of eighteenth-century republicanism, were little more than the
vehicles by which organized factions sought control of the organs of
government for the purpose of pursuing their own self-interest at the expense
of the common good. 30 8 The factional pursuit of self-interest in turn had its
source in a strikingly postlapsarian view of human nature. On this view,
perhaps best expressed by Madison, human beings are inclined to "self-love"
and "passion," "fallible" in their reason, and prone to misusing reason in the
service of passion rather than the other way around. 3° 9 These weaknesses
have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual
animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each
other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity
of mankind to fall into mutual animosities that where no substantial occasion
presents itself the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been
sufficient to
kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent
310
conflicts.

This account provides two relevant pieces of information. First,
partisanship, along with the ideologies that parties invoke in defense of their
programs, are by definition false because they represent nothing more than
intellectual rationalizations of what are fundamentally manifestations of
human weakness---capitulations to the pursuit of irrational and selfinterested passion. Second, the world, on this view, is an exceedingly
dangerous place. The human capacity for self-interested venality is like a
loaded gun lying around, available for misuse upon the slightest provocation.
Any occasion might conceivably provide all the excuse necessary to trigger a
full-blown political conflict in which the participants form themselves into
parties and wage a contest in which the common good of society is ignored
and overwhelmed.

campaign to introduce nonpartisanship into democratic processes at the local level, and to a
lesser extent at the state level. For a discussion of Progressive tenets and reforms, see James
A. Gardner, Madison's Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral Systems, 86
IOWA L. REV. 87, 118-19 (2000), and sources cited therein.
308. On Madison's theory of factions, see THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison),
supra note 103, at 78.
309. Id. Madison is sometimes said to have derived this idea from Hume, see DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, bk. II, § 5 (1739), reprintedin HUME'S MORAL AND
PoLmrIcAL PiLOSOPIHY 23-27 (Henry D. Aiken ed., 1948), although it was undoubtedly
commonplace in the eighteenth century.
310. THE FEDERALISTNo. 10 (James Madison), supra note 103, at 79.
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Gerrymandering-the drawing of false and unnatural political
boundaries-provides just the kind of "frivolous and fanciful distinction[]"
of which Madison warned, the kind capable of "kindl[ing] unfriendly
passions and excit[ing] violent conflicts." Instead of conforming to natural
divisions, gerrymandered districts group people in artificial combinations,
causing them to chafe and grate against one another, and suggesting artificial
cleavages that human weakness and passion will find difficult to resist as
principles for organizing political contestation. Reason will supply an
ideological justification for the cleavage, and parties will arise to reify the
ideological justifications. 31 As candidates appeal for votes in ideological or
partisan terms, voters align themselves along these divisions, further reifying
and strengthening any latent divisions among them. Thus, in a district
comprising heterogeneous interests, normal processes of democratic
responsiveness are likely to result in an electorate divided along ideological
and partisan lines.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Recent experience with redistricting has made it painfully obvious that
state constitutional anti-gerrymandering provisions have been largely
ineffective at constraining attempts to gerrymander for partisan gain.31 2 In an
age of powerful computers and detailed, widely available data about voting
patterns, well-worn state constitutional requirements of district contiguity,
compactness, and respect for local government boundaries and communities
of interest are31 3 easily evaded by redistricters intent on partisan
gerrymandering.
311.

See POLE, supra note 82, at 247 ("One of the habitual sentiments offended by this

famous gerrymander law was that of community. Voters did not think of themselves as mere
numbers; the petitions complained that old connections had been sundered by the new
divisions. Genuine 'interests' had been divided. The only interest served was that of the
party.").
312.

See supra note 4.

313. For example, as one commentator has observed, "cleverly executed, compactness
could either divide or pack any community of interest-geographic, partisan, or racial."
Richard Morrill, A Geographer's Perspective, in POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE

COURTS, supra note 178, at 212, 214-15. Another observes: "mathematical contiguity does not
reflect a constraint on electoral manipulation, as any given noncontiguous district ... can be
made contiguous by adding arbitrarily thin connecting lines, without materially changing the
results of an election held in that district." Altman, supra note 104, at 164; see also Micah
Altman, The Computational Complexity of Automated Redistricting: Is Automation the
Answer?, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 81 (1997) (explaining why automated
computer algorithms are incapable of providing value-neutral redistricting).

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37:881

The preceding analysis of state constitutional conceptions of
representative politics suggests at least one reason why this is the case. The
problem is not merely the persistence and intensity of partisan motivations,
nor the use of sophisticated, computerized districting tools. The problem is
that state constitutional anti-gerrymandering provisions-the so-called
"traditional districting principles"-have no real utility in preventing
partisan gerrymandering because they are aimed at a completely different
problem: preserving the integrity of local economies in a political system
based on the representation of homogeneous local communities of economic
interest. The traditional districting principles typically enshrined in state
constitutions offer no help in crafting redistricting plans in which political
parties and their adherents are represented fairly because the traditional
districting principles do not contemplate that parties or their adherents will
be represented at all. Indeed, the representation of parties and partisan
interests under these provisions is ruled out entirely as a failure of proper
principles of representation, and they consequently offer no guidance
whatsoever about what might even count as a "fair" distribution of partisan
electoral influence. To invoke such provisions in the hope that they will yield
"politically neutral standards for measuring the particular burden a given
partisan classification imposes on representational rights" 31 4 is therefore to
use the wrong tool for the job.
This analysis, however, still leaves unanswered an important question.
Do state constitutions have other resources (besides the usual panoply of
anti-gerrymandering restrictions) that might provide a sound basis for
controlling partisan gerrymandering? There are reasons to think so.
The present federal constitutional theory of fair political representation
derives less from any analysis of the provisions of the United States
Constitution that structure the political process than from the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth
Amendment's prohibition on racial discrimination in voting.1 5 These
314. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 308 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,concurring in
judgment).
315. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which established the one-person, onevote doctrine for state legislative districts, and White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), which
validated a theory of racially discriminatory submersion of the minority vote, both rested on
Fourteenth Amendment principles of equal protection. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966), sustained the Voting Rights Act's powerful prohibitions on racial
discrimination in voting on Fifteenth Amendment grounds. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980), found intentional discrimination to be constitutionally required to make out voting
rights claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. About the only exception to
this trend is Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8, 17 (1964), in which the Court relied on
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provisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held, introduced into the
Constitution a principle of representation vastly different from the one
previously recognized in state constitutions: the representation of persons.3 16
The application of this principle of representation to state constitutional
systems structured along very different principles of representation played
havoc with those systems and contributed significantly to the emergence of
the present problems of partisan gerrymandering.
However, state constitutions have not remained static during this time.
Indeed, among the defining characteristics of state constitutions are their ease
of amendment, the frequency with which they are in fact amended, and their
consequent amenability to doctrinal and conceptual evolution,3 t7 processes
capable of creating layers of constitutional meaning that Alan Tarr has
likened to geological strata. 318 In the course of this evolutive process, many
state constitutions have acquired provisions that might well prove more
fruitful resources for constraining partisan gerrymandering than the set of
traditional provisions I have examined here. Many state constitutions, for
example, contain equal protection clauses of their own, or other, similar
provisions that might be understood to constitutionalize principles of
equality, fair representation, or fair politics. 3 19 An evolving new generation
Article I, Section 2 to invalidate malapportionment in congressional districting. For a critique
of the Court's frequent reliance in electoral cases on the Constitution's individual rights
provisions rather than its structural provisions, see generally Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme
Court, 2003 Term-Foreword: The Constitutionalizationof Democratic Politics, 118 HARV.
L. REv. 28 (2004).
316. As indicated earlier, the Court's equal protection jurisprudence holds that the
theory of representation embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment is representation of persons.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562. Indeed, the Court has explicitly rejected the proposition that
representation of groups plays any role in the constitutional structure of politics. See
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971).
317. See TARR, supra note 13, at 23-26.
318. Id. at 193.
319. For example, many state constitutions have provisions requiring elections to be
"free," e.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 10; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 17, or "free and equal," e.g., ARiz.
CONST. art. II, § 21; IND. CONST. art. 2, § 1. These are potentially promising sources of
political rights that could implicate fair party competition. Not all state courts, however, have
been amenable to looking beyond the traditional districting principles as constraints on
gerrymandering. The New York Court of Appeals, for example, has held that "the [state]
constitutional requirements of compactness, contiguity and convenience. . . were adopted for
the salutary purpose of averting the political gerrymander and at present are the only means
available to the courts for containing that pernicious practice." Schneider v. Rockefeller, 293
N.E.2d 67, 72 (N.Y. 1972) (emphasis added). The Vermont Supreme Court has reached a
similar conclusion. In re Reapportionment of Towns of Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor,
624 A.2d 323, 343-44 (Vt. 1993) (rejecting a challenge to gerrymandering under the state
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of state constitutional provisions aimed explicitly at partisan districting may
also hold some promise. 320 Finally, an extensive historical legacy on the state
level of egalitarian and process-oriented political reform movements such as
Progressivism and populist democracy 321 might also contain resources that
could be mined in an effort to locate constitutional principles capable of
restraining partisan excesses in the redistricting process. That, however, is a
project for another day.
constitution's "common benefit" clause, its equivalent of the federal Equal Protection Clause,
and holding that "[tihe constitutional provisions governing reapportionment are selfcontained; there is no indication that additional limits on legislative prerogatives were
intended to be applied from other parts of the constitution"); see also Stephenson v. Bartlett,
562 S.E.2d 377, 390 (N.C. 2002) (ruling that the legislature may take account of "partisan
advantage and incumbency protection" in redistricting, but that "it must do so in conformity
with the State Constitution," thereby suggesting in context that the state constitution does not
contain any constraints on gerrymandering other than provisions implementing traditional
districting principles). Some other state courts may have foreclosed other state constitutional
avenues for controlling gerrymandering by reading the state constitution to have the same
meaning as the U.S. Constitution and to contain precisely the same standards for adjudicating
gerrymandering claims, and only those standards. See, e.g., In re Reapportionment Plan for
Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 665 (Pa. 1981) ("the federal constitutional requirement of
equal protection ... is incorporated as a matter of state constitutional law in" provisions of the
state constitution requiring compactness, contiguity, and population equality in redistricting,
thereby committing the court to follow federal gerrymandering jurisprudence); Erfer v.
Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 331-32 (Pa. 2002) (expressly adopting Bandemer standard for
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering); In re Senate Bill No. 220, 593 P.2d 1, 5-6 (Kan. 1979)
(holding, in a case of first impression under the state constitution's reapportionment
provisions, that the relevant principles are found in federal reapportionment jurisprudence
under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Kendall v. Douglas, Grant, Lincoln & Okanogan
Counties Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 6, 820 P.2d 497, 503 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (applying
Bandemer standard to what may be a state constitutional claim of political gerrymandering).
Doubt as to the existence of any independent state constitutional jurisprudence of
gerrymandering beyond that required by provisions implementing traditional districting
principles is also raised in Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 664 (Md. 1993)
(suggesting that general claims of unfairness about redistricting plans otherwise in compliance
with constitutional standards will be received skeptically).
320. See supra note 319.
As Laura J. Scalia has observed, in distinguishing state constitutionalism from its
321.
federal counterpart: "At the state level, the living determined which principles and procedures
reflected society's reasoned understanding of the good state. As a result, constitutional content
evolved in accordance with the manners, opinions, and circumstances of the postfounding
generation." LAURA J. SCALIA, AMERICA'S JEFFERSONIAN EXPERIMENT: REMAKING STATE
CONSTrrUTIONS, 1820-1850, at 5 (1999). Among the many postfounding movements to leave
their mark on state constitutions, few had more influence than Progressivism, and its close
cousin, Populism. See, e.g., TARR, supra note 13, at 94 (noting that Populism is one of several
nineteenth-century movements that "produced fundamental shifts in state constitutions"), 15053 (reviewing the impact of Progressivism on state constitutional reform).

